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We investigated whether manipulating the duration for which an item is studied has opposite effects on
recognition memory and repetition priming, as has been reported by Voss and Gonsalves (2010). Robust
evidence of this would support the idea that distinct explicit and implicit memory systems drive recog-
nition and priming, and would constitute evidence against a single-system model (Berry, Shanks,
Speekenbrink, & Henson, 2012). Across seven experiments using study durations ranging from 40 ms
to 2250 ms, and two different priming tasks (a classification task in Experiments 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4, and
a continuous identification with recognition (CID-R) task in Experiments 1b, 2b, and 3b), we found that
although a longer study duration improved subsequent recognition in each experiment, there was either
no detectable effect on priming (Experiments 1a, 2a, and 4) or a similar effect to that on recognition,
albeit smaller in magnitude (Experiments 1b, 2b, 3a, and 3b). Our findings (1) question whether study
duration has opposite effects on recognition and priming, and (2) are robustly consistent with a
single-system model of recognition and priming.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Comparisons of recognition memory and long-term repetition
priming have played a major role in the development of theories
of the organization of memory (Squire & Dede, 2015; Tulving &
Schacter, 1990). Recognition memory refers to the capacity to
judge whether an item (e.g., a word or object) has been presented
before in a particular context. Long-term repetition priming
(henceforth priming) refers to a change in identification, detection,
or production of an item, which occurs as a result of prior exposure
to the same or a similar item. This change is often evident as an
improvement in performance and can persist over minutes or
longer (and so can be considered long-term). For example, identifi-
cation latencies of objects that have been presented before in a
study phase tend to be shorter than those of novel nonpresented
items. Individuals with amnesia, arising from damage to the med-
ial temporal lobes/hippocampus, show marked deficits in recogni-
tion memory, and yet their capacity to show priming can be left
relatively intact, compared to normal adults (e.g., Hamann &
Squire, 1997; Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993). Various experimen-tal manipulations have also been shown to differentially affect
recognition and priming in healthy individuals and, together with
the findings from amnesic individuals, have been used to support
the now widely held multiple-systems view that recognition and
priming are driven by functionally and neurally distinct explicit
and implicit memory systems in the brain (Gabrieli, 1998;
Squire, 2004; Squire & Dede, 2015; Tulving & Schacter, 1990).
Despite decades of research, the idea that there exists a sharp
distinction between explicit and implicit memory systems is still
disputed (see e.g., Addante, 2015; Berry, Shanks, Speekenbrink, &
Henson, 2012; Dew & Cabeza, 2011; Hannula & Greene, 2012;
Henke, 2010; Reder, Park, & Kieffaber, 2009; Shanks & Berry,
2012). Recognition memory and priming, in particular, may not
be independent from one another as once thought. Many experi-
mental factors that were initially believed to selectively affect
either recognition or priming (providing evidence for a single dis-
sociation) have since been shown to have similar effects on recog-
nition and priming. This has been shown, for example, with the
effects of normal aging (Ward, Berry, & Shanks, 2013a, 2013b),
divisions of attention at encoding (Berry, Henson, & Shanks,
2006), retroactive interference (Eakin & Smith, 2012), changes in
presentation modality between study and test phases (Craik,
Moscovitch, & McDowd, 1994; Mulligan & Osborn, 2009), levels
of processing (Brown & Mitchell, 1994), and also amnesia (Berry,
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a well-known limitation with the use of single dissociations (and
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing) as evidence for multiple sys-
tems, which is that they rely on concluding that an effect of a vari-
able on either recognition or priming is absent. Such a conclusion is
problematic given that the variable may actually have an effect
that, in reality, is relatively small and hard to detect, particularly
if the sensitivity of the task is relatively low (Buchner & Wippich,
2000; Dunn, 2003). The same limitation applies when two single
dissociations are used together to provide evidence of a double dis-
sociation (see Dunn, 2003).
Stronger support for the notion that recognition and priming
are driven by multiple systems would be a crossover dissociation,
that is, a demonstration that an independent variable has opposite
effects on recognition and priming. Such evidence, however, is rare.
One classic example was reported by Jacoby (1983), who found
that generating a target word from its antonym in the study phase
(i.e., generate the word ‘cold’ from the cue ‘hot-???’) led to greater
subsequent recognition of the target compared to when a target
word had simply been read during study. In contrast, the same
encoding manipulation produced less priming (in a perceptual
identification task) for items that were generated rather than read.
This pattern has been replicated by others (e.g., Blaxton, 1989;
Masson & MacLeod, 1992) and has also been demonstrated with
auditory stimuli (e.g., Dew & Mulligan, 2008), and suggests that
recognition and priming rely on different sources of information.
However, this dissociation can alternatively be interpreted in
terms of the principle of transfer appropriate processing, whereby
recognition and priming in the perceptual identification task dif-
ferentially rely upon conceptual and perceptual processes, rather
than distinct explicit and implicit memory systems (Blaxton,
1989; Jacoby, 1983). The idea is that generating a word evokes con-
ceptual processing, which supports greater performance on a
recognition task that draws heavily upon this type of processing.
Conversely, reading a word evokes perceptual processing, support-
ing greater perceptual priming for the item. The production of a
crossover dissociation using a read-generate manipulation at
encoding also seems to critically depend upon words being gener-
ated from antonyms at encoding, since other methods of generat-
ing targets do not produce a reversal in the generation effect in
priming (see Mulligan & Dew, 2009). On the whole, read-
generate manipulations only produce a crossover dissociation
between recognition and priming under very specific conditions,
and, even when produced, may not necessarily reflect the opera-
tions of distinct explicit and implicit memory systems.
Other evidence for a crossover dissociation was more recently
provided by Voss and Gonsalves (2010), who reported that study
duration has opposite effects on recognition and priming. In the
study phase of their experiment, participants classified pictures
of objects presented for a brief (250 ms) or long duration
(2000 ms) as natural or manmade. In the test phase, participants
were presented with previously studied pictures of objects (half
that were previously presented for a brief duration, and half for a
long duration), and new objects for 500 ms, and once again were
asked to classify the items as natural or manmade. The priming
effect was calculated as the mean classification RT to new items
minus the mean classification RT to old items (brief or long). After
each classification, an old/new recognition judgment was made.
Significant priming effects were found for both brief and long
items, but, crucially, the mean priming effect was 19 ms (95% CI
[6, 32], Cohen’s dz = 0.855, estimated from the results in Voss and
Gonsalves) greater for brief items than for long items. The recogni-
tion results showed the opposite pattern: the proportion of long
items correctly judged old (hits) was significantly greater than
the proportion of brief items correctly judged old. (Both long and
brief items were also judged old more often than new items.)Voss and Gonsalves (2010) also measured event-related poten-
tial (ERP) responses during the test phase. The main findings here
were that ERPs to objects that had been studied for a brief duration
were more negative than those for new objects at parieto-occipital
electrodes in the 200–400 ms interval after the stimulus onset at
test, and this was not observed for long items. Instead, ERPs to
objects that had been studied for a long duration were more posi-
tive in central-parietal electrodes in the 400–600 ms interval, rela-
tive to new objects, and this was not found for brief items. Given
the behavioural differences between priming and recognition for
brief and long conditions, the early negative repetition effects for
brief items were attributed to priming, and the later positive
effects were attributed to explicit remembering. The overall find-
ings were taken as evidence against a single-system view of recog-
nition and priming, and instead were taken to support a multiple
systems view in which study duration differentially engages inde-
pendent explicit and implicit memory systems at encoding.
Earlier studies looked at the effects of study duration on recog-
nition and priming, but the majority used relatively long durations
even in the brief condition (i.e., 1s or longer), and reported single
dissociations in which longer durations improved recognition but
had little or no effect on priming (e.g., comparing durations of 1s
vs. 3s in Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 1s vs. 10s in Musen, 1991; 1s, 3s,
vs. 6.5s in Neill, Beck, Bottalico, & Molloy, 1990). von Hippel and
Hawkins (1994) used study durations shorter than 1s, and found
that performance in two explicit memory tasks (graphemic and
semantic cued recall) and three implicit memory tasks (word frag-
ment completion, perceptual identification and general knowl-
edge) tended to be better as study duration increased from 50 ms
to 2000 ms, and no dissociation was observed in their study. The
authors did not include a recognition task, however, and recogni-
tion memory might reasonably be expected to increase across such
brief durations. Indeed, Wichmann, Sharpe, and Gegenfurtner
(2002) found that recognition memory (for scenes) increased reli-
ably across study durations of 50–1067 ms, though this study did
not include a priming measure.
Although a few studies have found that priming is not a mono-
tonically increasing function of study duration (e.g., Miyoshi &
Ashida, 2014; Miyoshi, Kimura, & Ashida, 2015; Zago, Fenske,
Aminoff, & Bar, 2005), these studies either did not additionally
examine recognition (Miyoshi et al., 2015; Zago et al., 2005), or,
if recognition was also examined, found no evidence of a dissocia-
tion (Miyoshi & Ashida, 2014; though this study was particularly
focused on recognition accuracy for guesses). These studies are dis-
cussed further in the General Discussion. The study by Voss and
Gonsalves (2010) is, to our knowledge, the first to demonstrate
that study duration produces a crossover dissociation between
recognition and priming when the encoding conditions are identi-
cal for both tasks. We regard such demonstrations as more com-
pelling than comparisons of individual priming or recognition
conditions from different studies because they help to limit the
range of alternative explanations of the dissociation (see also
Ryan & Cohen, 2003).
Why might a brief study duration cause greater priming than a
long one? Voss and Gonsalves (2010) offered two potential expla-
nations. A study duration of approximately 250 ms might be opti-
mal if priming is driven by neural ‘‘sharpening” and ‘‘selection”
processes. Indeed Zago et al. (2005) observed a duration-
dependent rise and fall of cortical brain deactivation in a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of priming. An alterna-
tive transfer-appropriate processing hypothesis is that the rapid
perceptual processing required to identify a briefly-presented
study item, as compared to a long-duration study item, transfers
better to the test phase, which also requires rapid identification.
If study duration has opposite effects on recognition and priming
then this would pose a serious challenge for single-system theories
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cluded that their findings are difficult to reconcile with a single-
system view, such as the model proposed by Berry, Shanks, and
Henson (2008) in which recognition and priming are driven by
the same underlyingmemory system or signal. This model, and rea-
sons why such a crossover dissociation presents a challenge, are
outlined in the next section.The single-system model and predictions
The single-system model has been shown to predict many
results concerning recognition and priming, and has even been
shown to outperform numerous multiple-systems versions of the
model (see Berry et al., 2008, 2012, 2014). The model is outlined
here in order to formally describe its relevant predictions and to
explain why it does not predict a crossover dissociation. The
single-system model assumes that each item at test is associated
with a memory strength variable f, which is a normally distributed,
random variable with mean mX and standard deviationrf (i.e., f  N
(mX, rf)), where the subscript X denotes the stimulus type (e.g., old,
new, brief, long etc.). To generate a response for an item in the
recognition task, its value of f is first added to a noise variable, er,
which is also a normally distributed random variable with a mean
of zero (i.e.,M(er) = 0) and standard deviation rr (i.e., er  N(0, rr)).
Summing f with er gives Jr:
Jr ¼ f þ er: ð1Þ
An item’s value of Jr is then compared to a response criterion, C
(a scalar), and, as in signal detection models (Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005), if Jr exceeds C, then the item is judged old, or else
it is judged new. Because old items have been presented in the
study phase, they will tend to have a greater mean f than new
items at test. When mold is greater than mnew (i.e., mold  mnew > 0),
old items will tend to be judged old more often than new items
(i.e., the hit rate will be greater than the false alarm rate), and so
a measure of sensitivity (e.g., d0) will be greater than the level
expected according to chance (e.g., d0 > 0). The mean f of new items
is set to equal zero (i.e., mnew = 0), and hence sensitivity is directly
related to the value of mold (because mold  mnew = mold  0 = mold). In
previous applications of the model (Berry et al., 2012, 2014), the
values of rf and rr were set to equal
p
0.5, and the expected value
of d0 is therefore equal to mold (because d0 = (mold  mnew)/rJr, and
rJr =
p
(rf2 + rr2) = 1).
The same value of f that was used to generate an item’s response
in the recognition task is used to generate its response in the prim-
ing task. This assumption is what makes the model a single-system
model—that the recognition and priming measures of an item are
calculated from the same value of the memory signal f. Crucially,
however, f is subjected to another and independent source of noise,
ep, in the generation of a priming task response, where ep is another
normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero (i.e.,
M(ep) = 0) and standard deviation rp (i.e., ep  N(0, rp)). For exam-
ple, in a task where priming effects are measured using response
times (RTs), such as an identification or classification task, f can
be combined with ep to give the RT as follows:
RT ¼ b sf þ ep; ð2Þ
where the parameters b and s are scalars: b is the RT intercept and s
is the rate of change in RTwith f; the parameter s also serves to scale
the variance of ep (because Eq. (2) could be rewritten equivalently
as RT = b – s(f + ep) with ep suitably rescaled). The influence of f on
RT is therefore such that RT is a decreasing function of f in Eq.
(2)—the greater the f value of an item, the faster the RT. Because
old items have a greater mean f than new items, the RT for old items
will tend to be faster than the RT of new items and the model willproduce a priming effect. It follows from Eq. (2) that the expected
RT of an item is b  smX. For new items, because mnew = 0, the
expected RT is b  s(0) = b. For old items, the expected RT is
b  smold. The expected priming effect is given as the difference in
expected RT to new and old items, b  (b  smold) = smold. Thus, as
with recognition memory, the magnitude of priming is positively
related to mold.
Varying mold will therefore produce similar effects on both
recognition (for which predicted d0 = mold) and priming (=smold),
but because there are differences in the way that f is transformed
for each task, the rate of change in priming and recognition with
mold is not necessarily the same (e.g., if standardised effect sizes
are computed and compared). The effect on priming could even
be so small as to often go empirically undetected (Berry et al.,
2006; Dunn, 2003). If mold were greater for items presented for a
longer duration at study compared to a brief duration, the model
would predict that both priming and recognition will increase with
study duration. Thus, if study duration had opposite effects on
recognition and priming, then this would be strong evidence
against the model.
From Eqs. (1) and (2) it follows that Jr and RT will be jointly dis-
tributed as a bivariate normal distribution with covariance equal to
–srf2 (and mean vector equal to [mold, smold], if mnew is fixed to zero).
The negative covariance between Jr and RT leads the model to pre-
dict differences in RTs when classified according to the recognition
judgment. We have described these predictions in detail elsewhere
(see Berry et al., 2012, 2014), and only outline them here because
they are tested in the experiments to follow. First, because the
mean f of items judged old (i.e., items with Jr > C) tends to be
greater than of items judged new (i.e., those with Jr < C), and
because differences in mean f tend to translate to differences in
RT (Eq. (2)), items judged old will tend to have shorter RTs than
items judged new. This will be the case, even within old and new
item types. The model therefore predicts that RTs to hits (old items
judged old) will be faster than those of misses (old items judged
new) (i.e., mean(RT| hit) < mean(RT| miss), and that the mean RT
of false alarms (new items judged old) will tend to be faster than
those of correct rejections (new items judged new) (i.e., mean
(RT| false alarm) < mean(RT| correct rejection)).
Second, the model makes a prediction concerning the magni-
tude of the priming effect relative to the magnitude of the priming
effect when calculated using only items judged new (i.e., misses
and correct rejections). Although prior studies have taken priming
for items judged new as evidence for the independence of the
memorial sources driving recognition and priming (Stark &
McClelland, 2000), this pattern is, in fact, predicted by the single
system model simply because the mean f of misses tends to be
greater than of correct rejections (when lold > 0), which then trans-
lates to differences in RT (Eq. (2)) (see Berry et al., 2008). The mean
difference in f between misses and correct rejections, however, will
tend to be smaller than the mean difference in f between all new
and old items. This is because the magnitude of the difference in
Jr for misses and correct rejections is necessarily restricted by C.
Differences in Jr tend to translate into differences in f, which in turn
translate into differences in RT. The difference in RT to misses and
correct rejections (i.e., the priming effect for items judged new)
will therefore tend to be smaller than the difference in RT to new
and old items (i.e., the priming effect).
In sum, the single-system model predicts that (1) experimental
variables will not have opposite effects on recognition and priming
because the magnitude of recognition and priming are both posi-
tively related to the strength of the memory signal in the model,
so if a longer study duration improves recognition, then it will also
lead to greater priming, though not necessarily by the same mag-
nitude; (2) RTs of items judged old will be shorter than those of
items judged new, even within old and new item types (i.e.,
C.J. Berry et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 97 (2017) 154–174 157mean(RT| hit) < mean(RT| miss), and also mean(RT| false alarm)
< mean(RT| correct rejection)); (3) the priming effect will be
greater than the priming effect for items judged new. Our primary
concern in this article is to test Prediction 1 by considering the
effect of study duration on recognition and priming, though the
nature of the paradigm used also enables Predictions 2 and 3 to
be tested, potentially allowing for further validation of the model.Experiments 1a and 1b
The aim of Experiment 1a was to reproduce the finding that
study duration has opposite effects on recognition and priming,
thereby providing data that would be challenging for the single-
system model. At study, participants classified objects as natural
or manufactured, which were presented for a relatively brief
(250 ms) or long duration (2250 ms). In the test phase, on each trial
they again classified old and new objects as natural or manufac-
tured, before making a recognition judgment in relation to the
item. The design of Experiment 1a was similar to Voss and
Gonsalves’ (2010) experiment but differed in the following ways:
items in the long duration condition were presented for 2250 ms,
rather than 2000 ms, there were fewer trials per study duration
condition (48 vs. 85), there was a greater variation in the size of
the stimuli (3–7 of visual angle vs. 4), the images were drawn
from a smaller pool (192 v. 320); participants’ handedness was
not controlled for in Experiment 1a, but all participants were
right-handed in Voss and Gonsalves (2010); speed of responding
was heavily emphasised in the test phase of Voss and Gonsalves
(2010), but in Experiment 1a participants were instructed to make
their classification response as quickly as possible but to not sacri-
fice accuracy; and finally, trials in the test phase were self-paced in
Experiment 1a, whereas in Voss and Gonsalves’ (2010) experiment
each test trial advanced automatically. These differences were con-
trolled for in Experiment 4, which used the same methods as Voss
and Gonsalves (2010) (and, to preview, yielded a similar pattern of
findings to Experiment 1a).
Experiment 1b used the same procedure as Experiment 1a
except that, in the test phase, the classification task was replaced
with a continuous identification with recognition task (CID-R task,
Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; Stark & McClelland, 2000) to
measure recognition and priming. In this task, an item gradually
clarifies from a mask on each test trial and participants press a but-
ton when they are able to identify the item; they then make a
recognition judgment to the item. Repetition priming is evident
if identification RTs to old items are shorter than those for new
items.
The CID-R task was used in place of the classification task in
Experiment 1b for several reasons: first, we sought to determine
whether the priming results would generalise to a task in which
the responses at test were not identical to the responses required
at study, as is the case when the same classification task (natural
vs. manufactured) is used in both the study task and also the task
used to measure priming. When the response is identical at study
and test, priming effects can be largely driven by retrieval of bind-
ings between the stimulus (e.g., table) and the response (e.g., man-
ufactured) that are formed during the study phase (Horner &
Henson, 2009). This contrasts with the commonly held notion that
priming effects can be driven by facilitation in the perceptual or
conceptual processing of a stimulus. Any priming effects that occur
in the CID-R task would arguably not be due to the retrieval of
stimulus-response bindings because the type of response required
to items at test (i.e., identification) is distinct from the type of
response required in the study phase (i.e., classification) (Henson,
Eckstein,Waszak, Frings, & Horner, 2014). Second, there is evidence
to suggest that priming in the CID-R task is unaffected byintentional (explicit) retrieval strategies (Ward et al., 2013b), which
is an important concern whenmeasuring priming or implicit mem-
ory more generally (MacLeod, 2008). Finally, recognition and prim-
ing in the CID-R task have been shown to follow the predictions of
the single-system model, and so if study duration has opposite
effects on recognition and priming when measured with the CID-
R task, then this would require re-evaluation of this earlier work.
Method
Participants
There were 32 participants in Experiment 1a (classification
task) (24 female, mean age = 20.8 years, SD = 3.2 years) and 24 par-
ticipants in Experiment 1b (CID-R task) (23 female, mean
age = 19.8 years, SD = 1.8 years). All individuals in this and subse-
quent experiments were psychology undergraduate students from
University College London, the University of York, and/or Middle-
sex University who participated in partial fulfilment of a course
requirement. Since the results from the classification task were
more important for the purposes of replicating Voss and
Gonsalves (2010), a greater number of participants were assigned
to this task in this and subsequent experiments to ensure relatively
high power. The power of Experiments 1a and 1b to detect an
effect of study duration on priming of the same size as was found
by Voss and Gonsalves (2010) (dz = 0.855) was 0.997 and 0.980
(two-tailed), respectively.
Materials
The stimuli were 192 color images of familiar objects (e.g., a
tree, a chair) presented on a white background. The visual angle
of each object ranged between 3 and 7 degrees in both the horizon-
tal and vertical dimensions. Half were naturally occurring objects,
and half were manufactured. For each participant, forty-eight
images were randomly assigned to the 250 ms and 2250 ms study
exposure duration conditions. These items were presented at study
and test. The remaining 96 images were assigned to the new con-
dition and were only presented at test. For each participant, images
were randomly assigned to the 250 ms, 2250 ms, and new condi-
tions such that each condition contained an equal number of nat-
ural and manufactured images. A different random assignment of
images was used for each participant. The mask measured
12  12 degrees of visual angle and consisted of a 30  30 grid,
the elements of which were randomly filled with fragments of pic-
tures of objects that were not part of the main stimuli set.
Procedure
Experiment 1a. For the study phase, participants were told that
they would see a series of objects in rapid succession and that they
must press the ‘‘1” key or the ‘‘4” key to indicate whether they
thought each object presented was ‘natural’ or ‘manufactured
(manmade)’, respectively. They were told that the pictures would
be presented quickly, for different durations, and that they should
respond based on the first impression regarding the category. The
labels ‘‘1 = natural”, ‘‘4 = manufactured” were shown in 28 pt black
Arial font below the central region where the stimuli appeared, and
remained on screen as reminders for the duration of the study
phase. Before the first trial commenced, the cue ‘‘Get Ready!”
was presented in the centre of the screen in black 28 pt Arial font
for 4s. On each study trial, an image was presented for 250 ms or
2250 ms and was followed by the presentation of the mask for
2250 ms or 250 ms, respectively, such that the duration of each
study trial was always 2500 ms. The same mask was used on each
trial. The next trial was presented immediately following the pre-
sentation of the mask, which gave the appearance of a continuous
sequence of flashing pictures, alternating with a mask. Voss and
Gonsalves (2010) also presented trials in a continuous stream at
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domly intermixed. For a given trial, the response recording win-
dow lasted from the onset of the stimulus to the offset of the mask.
After the study phase, there was a retention interval of approx-
imately 3 min, during which the participant read instructions for
the test phase. These informed participants that, similar to the first
stage, they would have to classify each object according to whether
it is natural or manufactured by pressing 1 or 4, respectively, and
to try to be as fast as they could when making their judgment,
but not to sacrifice accuracy. At the start of each trial, a ‘‘+” fixation
point was presented in the centre of the screen for 500 ms with the
labels ‘‘1 = natural, 4 = manufactured” presented beneath the stim-
ulus presentation area, as in the study phase. An item was then
presented for 500 ms, followed by the mask for 1500 ms. The cat-
egorization labels remained on screen until the participant made a
response. Following a classification or identification response, as in
Voss and Gonsalves (2010), the prompt for the recognition decision
(‘‘1 = high confidence new, 2 = low confidence new, 3 = low confidence
old, 4 = high confidence old”) was presented in the centre of the
screen until a response was made. The initial instructions informed
participants that ‘‘old” means that the item was presented in the
first stage, and ‘‘new” means that it had not been presented before
and that half of the objects were old. They were told that for this
rating, it was more important to be accurate than fast. There were
192 trials in total, containing all items from the 250 ms, 2250 ms,
and new conditions, randomly intermixed. Participants were
tested individually, and the total duration of the experiment was
approximately 30 min.
For each participant, individual RTs less than 200 ms were
excluded from the analysis. The RT mean and SD were then calcu-
lated (collapsed across all conditions) and trials were removed
from the analysis if the RT on the trial was greater than three times
the standard deviation from the mean RT. This was done separately
for the study and test phases. A correct categorization response to
an item was defined as the modal categorisation judgment to the
item at study and test across participants. The data were also anal-
ysed when trials were excluded on the basis of the correctness of
classification responses, and the same pattern of results was
found.11 The analyses reported in the Results sections of Experiment 1–3 were repeated
except with items at test removed from the analyses if they were categorized
incorrectly either at study or test. We did not do this for Experiment 4, where we
instead followed the same analysis method as Voss and Gonsalves (2010). For this
analysis, it is worth bearing in mind that there is a degree of subjectivity in the
classification judgment and also that the removal of trials results in decreased
statistical power. The proportion of each trial type that was removed because of an
incorrect classification response at test (in Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a) is given in
Table 5. Of the remaining trials, the percentage of old trials at test that were excluded
because the item on those trials was incorrectly classified at study was as follows:
Experiment 1a, M = 10.01%, SE = 2.19; Experiment 1b, M = 7.56%, SE = 1.22;
Experiment 2a, M = 5.50%, SE = 0.56%; Experiment 2b, M = 6.89%, SE = 1.22;
Experiment 3a, M = 16.13%, SE = 1.55%; Experiment 3b, M = 21.21%, SE = 1.78. Minor
differences in the remaining experiments are reported below. The results are
presented here for comparison, but the conclusions drawn in the main article are
unaffected. In Experiment 1a, the only difference in results was that RTs to misses in
the 2250 ms condition were now significantly faster than those of correct rejections, t
(29) = 2.07, p = 0.048. In Experiment 1b, the difference in priming between the
conditions was no longer significant, t(23) = 1.64, p = 0.11, although priming was still
numerically greater in the 2250 ms condition. There was no difference in the pattern
of significance in Experiments 2a or 2b. In Experiment 3a, the repeated measures
ANOVA comparing the magnitude of priming across the 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350
ms, 500 ms, and 1900 ms conditions was no longer significant, F(3.44, 96.17) = 1.55, p
= 0.18, although the linear trend across these conditions remained significant, F(1, 28)
= 7.31, p = 0.012. Also, while numerically greater, the magnitude of priming in the
1900 ms condition was no longer significantly greater than in the 250 ms condition, t
(28) = 1.61, p = 0.12. Finally, the difference between the RTs to correct rejections and
misses to items in the 40 ms condition was now significant, t(28) = 2.43, p = 0.022. In
Experiment 3b, when RTs were broken down according to the recognition judgments,
the priming effect for items judged new was only marginally significant in the 250
ms, t(23) = 2.05, p = 0.052, and 1900 ms, t(23) = 2.06, p = 0.051, conditions.In this and subsequent experiments, an alpha level of 0.05 was
used for all statistical tests, and t tests are two-tailed, unless indi-
cated. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied on tests
involving repeated-measures factors with more than two levels.
The priming effect was calculated for each old item condition as
the mean RT for new items minus the mean RT for old items.
Cohen’s dz is given as the measure of effect size for the effect of
study duration on recognition and priming. This is calculated as
dz =Mz/SDz where the subscript z denotes the difference in scores
between two measures in a within-subjects design. For repeated
measures ANOVA, partial eta squared gp2 is also given as the effect
size (as calculated by SPSS). For the analysis of the recognition data
in this experiment and subsequent ones, ratings 1 and 2 were col-
lapsed for ‘‘new” judgments and ratings 3 and 4 were collapsed for
‘‘old” judgments. The hit rate was then calculated as the proportion
of old items judged old. The false alarm rate was calculated as the
proportion of new items judged old. Responses were not analysed
according to recognition confidence ratings in Experiments 1–3
because these results would not be directly relevant to our aims,
and there are fewer stimuli than in Voss and Gonsalves’ (2010)
experiment. Finally, in order to test Predictions 2 and 3 of the
single-system model, RTs to items at test were also analysed
according to whether the recognition response was a hit, a miss
(a ‘‘new” judgment to an old item), a false alarm or a correct rejec-
tion (a ‘‘new” judgment to a new item).Experiment 1b. The materials and procedures used in Experiment
1b were the same as those of Experiment 1a, except that priming
for each item at test was measured using the CID procedure, rather
than a classification task. The instructions informed the participant
that a picture would be presented on each trial, and that it would
become easier to identify with time; their task was to press the
enter key as soon as they were sure that they could correctly iden-
tify the object. The sequence on each trial was as follows: the mask
was presented for 500 ms. The picture was then presented for
17 ms (1 screen refresh at 60 Hz), and the mask then followed
for 233 ms, forming a 250 ms presentation block. The stimulus
was then immediately presented again for 17 ms, followed again
by the mask for 233 ms. The picture was then presented for a
slightly longer duration of 33 ms in the next presentation block,
with the mask being presented for the remaining 217 ms of the
block. Presentation continued in this way, with the duration of
the stimulus increasing by 17 ms on each alternate block and the
mask being presented for the remainder of the 250 ms block. This
gave the appearance of a stimulus that appeared to gradually clar-
ify from a background mask. If the enter key had not been pressed
after thirty 250 ms presentation blocks (i.e., after 7.5 s, when the
stimulus duration equalled the block duration) then the cue
‘‘Please try to be faster on the next trial” appeared for 1 s and the
programme automatically advanced to the next test trial. If the
participant pressed the enter key during the clarification proce-
dure, a white outlined box was presented, into which the partici-
pant typed their identification response (e.g., ‘tree’); they then
pressed the enter key and were prompted for their recognition
judgment using the same procedure as Experiment 1a.Results: Experiment 1a
A small proportion of trials from the study phase could not be
analysed because no key press response was made during the trial
(M = 1.40%, SD = 2.72). Of the remaining study trials, a small pro-
portion were removed because the RT was an outlier (M = 2.08%,
SD = 1.03; see Methods). A small proportion of test phase trials
were also excluded because the RT was an outlier (M = 1.53%,
SD = 0.69; see Methods).
2 Voss and Gonsalves (2010) did not report what proportion of study items were
not classified within the study trial duration.
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between the 250 ms (M = 34 ms, SE = 11) and 2250 ms conditions
(M = 34 ms, SE = 10), t(31) = 0.004, p = 0.997, dz = 0.0006 (Table 1
and Fig. 1a), whereas the recognition hit rate was significantly
greater in the 2250 ms than the 250 ms condition, t(31) = 6.29,
p < 0.001, dz = 1.11 (Table 2 and Fig. 1b). Seventeen out of 32 par-
ticipants showed greater priming in the 2250 ms condition than
the 250 ms condition, and 28 out of 32 participants had a higher
hit rate in the 2250 ms condition than the 250 ms condition. Prim-
ing effects were reliable (i.e., >0 ms) in the 250 ms condition, t(31)
= 3.02, p = 0.005, and also the 2250 ms condition, t(31) = 3.50, p =
0.001. The hit rate was also significantly greater than the false
alarm rate in both the 250 ms, t(31) = 34.08, p < 0.001, and 2250
ms, t(31) = 40.16, p < 0.001, conditions, demonstrating that these
items could be reliably discriminated from new items.
The RTs to items in the 250 ms and 2250 ms conditions did not
significantly differ in the study phase, t(31) = 1.15, p = 0.26
(Table 3). The percentage of errors made in the classification task
also did not significantly differ between the 250 ms and 2250 ms
conditions at study, t(31) = 0.15, p = 0.88 (Table 4), or across the
new, 250 ms, and 2250 ms conditions at test, F < 1 (Table 5). This
suggests that the priming effects observed did not reflect a
speed-accuracy trade-off.
Classification RTs at test were analysed according to the recog-
nition judgment in order to test Predictions 2 and 3 of the single-
system model. Participants in this and subsequent experiments
were excluded from this analysis if they had zero responses in at
least one of the hit, miss, false alarm or correct rejection categories.
By this criterion, one participant was excluded from this analysis.
As shown in Fig. 2a, RTs to hits did not significantly differ from
misses in either the 250 ms condition, t(30) = 0.099, p = 0.92,
or the 2250 ms condition, t(30) = 0.18, p = 0.86. Similarly, RTs
to false alarms did not significantly differ from correct rejections,
t(30) = 1.27, p = 0.22; the effect (M = 23 ms, 95% CI [14, 60]) only
very weakly supported Prediction 2. The priming effect for items
judged new (i.e., the mean RT for correct rejections minus the
mean RT for misses) was not significant in the 250 ms condition
(M = 35 ms, SE = 18), t(30) = 1.91, p = 0.066, or the 2250 ms condi-
tion, t(30) = 1.65, p = 0.11 (M = 38 ms, SE = 23). The priming effect
did not differ from the priming effect for items judged new in
either the 250 ms, t(30) = 0.03, p = 0.98, or 2250 ms conditions,
t(30) = 0.27, p = 0.79, failing to support Prediction 3.
Results: Experiment 1b
A small proportion of trials from the study phase were excluded
from the analysis because no key press response was made during
the trial (M = 0.87%, SD = 1.36). A further M = 2.46% (SD = 1.48) of
study trials were excluded because the RT was an outlier. For the
analysis of the test phase responses, a small proportion of trials
were not analysed because no identification keypress was made
(M = 0.35%, SD = 0.68), and a further M = 1.83% (SD = 1.46) of trials
were excluded because the RT was an outlier. The proportion of tri-
als excluded because the item was incorrectly identified was sim-
ilarly low (M < 1.5% of trials in each stimulus condition, Table 5),
and there was no significant difference in the error rate across con-
ditions, F < 1.
The magnitude of the priming effect was significantly greater in
the 2250 ms (M = 352 ms, SE = 40) condition than the 250 ms con-
dition (M = 257 ms, SE = 27), t(23) = 2.26, p = 0.034, dz = 0.46
(greater in 15 out of 24 participants) (Table 1 and Fig. 3a). The
hit rate was also greater in the 2250 ms condition than the
250 ms condition, t(23) = 5.44, p < 0.001, dz = 1.11 (in 21 out of
24 participants) (Table 2 and Fig. 3b). The priming effect was sig-
nificant in both the 250 ms, t(23) = 9.45, p < 0.001, and 2250 ms,
t(23) = 9.35, p < 0.001, conditions. In the recognition task, the hitrate was significantly greater than the false alarm rate in both
the 250 ms, t(23) = 15.85, p < 0.001, and 2250 ms, t(23) = 19.48, p
< 0.001, conditions. These priming and recognition results are
therefore in line with Prediction 1 of the single-system model. In
the study phase, classification RTs did not significantly differ
between the 250 ms and 2250 ms conditions, t(23) = 0.37, p =
0.72 (Table 3), nor did the percentage of incorrect classification
responses differ between conditions, t(23) = 1.96, p = 0.063
(Table 4).
When analysed according to the recognition memory judge-
ment, RTs to hits were found to be significantly shorter than RTs
to misses in the 250 ms condition, t(23) = 2.97, p = 0.007, and
the 2250 ms condition, t(23) = 3.97, p = 0.001 (Fig. 2b). RTs to false
alarms were also significantly faster than those of correct rejec-
tions, t(23) = 2.89, p = 0.008. This confirmed Prediction 2 of the
model. Furthermore, the priming effect for items judged new was
significant (i.e., >0 ms) in the 250 ms condition, t(23) = 2.65, p =
0.014 (M = 150 ms, SE = 57), but this was not the case for misses
in the 2250 ms condition, t(23) = 0.76, p = 0.46 (M = 76 ms, SE =
101). Finally, the priming effect was significantly greater than the
priming effect for items judged new in the 2250 ms condition, t
(23) = 3.45, p = 0.002, but not the 250 ms condition, t(23) = 1.85,
p = 0.078, offering some support for Prediction 3.Discussion
In Experiments 1a and 1b, no evidence was found to support the
claim that recognition and priming are affected in opposite ways
by study duration. In both experiments, recognition memory was
better for items presented for 2250 ms at study than 250 ms. Prim-
ing did not differ between these conditions when measured using a
classification task (Experiment 1a), but when measured using the
CID-R task, the magnitude of priming was significantly greater in
the 2250 ms condition than the 250 ms condition, which is con-
trary to Voss and Gonsalves’ (2010) finding. Thus, Prediction 1 of
the model was confirmed with the CID-R task, but not the classifi-
cation task. Support for Predictions 2 and 3 was also found with the
CID-R task, but not with the classification task; we discuss this fur-
ther in sections Discussion of Experiments 1–3, Modelling of Experi-
ments 1–4 and the General Discussion.Experiments 2a and 2b
Given the difference in results of Experiments 1a and 1b to
those of Voss and Gonsalves (2010), the aim of Experiments 2a
and 2b was to replicate the results of Experiments 1a and 1b while
improving upon one aspect of the study phase procedure. The
rapid, continuous nature of the trial presentation in the study
phase of Experiments 1a and 1b meant that some objects were
not classified within the 2.5 s trial duration.2 That is, in some
instances, a new trial was presented before participants had pro-
vided a classification response in relation to the object. It is possible
that this may have introduced an undesired unsystematic source of
variability, or noise, into the way in which items on some trials were
encoded. In an extreme case, if a participant happened to be partic-
ularly slow to respond on a given study trial, a classification
response to an item may have been made during the stimulus pre-
sentation on the following trial. In order to rule out the possibility
that this noise in encoding impacted upon the ability to detect differ-
ences in priming between the 250 ms and 2250 ms conditions, an
identical procedure to Experiments 1a and 1b was used in Experi-
ments 2a and 2b except that on each study trial, a classification
Table 1
Mean RTs (ms) in the priming task in the test phase.
Experiment and task Study duration (ms)
New 40 150 250 350 500 1900 2000 2250
1a Classification 893 (45) – – 859 (43) – – – – 859 (42)
1b CID-R 2426 (92) – – 2169 (96) – – – – 2074 (95)
2a Classification 986 (63) – – 943 (61) – – – – 922 (54)
2b CID-R 2437 (116) – – 2173 (113) – – – – 2038 (86)
3a Classification 1057 (56) 1040 (54) 1018 (49) 1021 (53) 1005 (53) 985 (47) 985 (48) – –
3b CID-R 3306 (114) 3270 (112) 3004 (110) 2921 (109) 2993 (93) 2941 (108) 2875 (91) – –
4 Classification 766 (33) – – 759 (33) – – – 766 (33) –
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. A dash indicates that this condition was not included in the experiment.
Fig. 1. Mean priming effect and recognition hit rate as a function of study duration in Experiment 1a (panels a and b), Experiment 2a (panels c and d), Experiment 3a (panels e
and f), and Experiment 4 (panels g and h). A classification task was used to measure priming in these experiments. The bars denote the experimental data and error bars
denote 95% confidence intervals. Open circles denote the mean of the expected model results across participants. ns = no significant difference. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
Table 2
Mean proportion of ‘‘Old” recognition judgments in the test phase.
Experiment and task Study duration (ms)
New 40 150 250 350 500 1900 2000 2250
1a Classification 0.17 (0.02) – – 0.78 (0.02) – – – – 0.88 (0.01)
1b CID-R 0.20 (0.02) – – 0.71 (0.03) – – – – 0.81 (0.02)
2a Classification 0.15 (0.01) – – 0.73 (0.02) – – – – 0.85 (0.02)
2b CID-R 0.23 (0.04) – – 0.67 (0.04) – – – – 0.73 (0.04)
3a Classification 0.28 (0.03) 0.33 (0.03) 0.58 (0.02) 0.65 (0.02) 0.69 (0.02) 0.71 (0.02) 0.75 (0.02) – –
3b CID-R 0.27 (0.04) 0.28 (0.03) 0.54 (0.04) 0.58 (0.04) 0.57 (0.03) 0.60 (0.05) 0.63 (0.05) – –
4 Classification 0.28 (0.03) – – 0.63 (0.02) – – – 0.71 (0.02) –
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. A dash indicates that this condition was not included in the experiment.
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Table 3
Mean classification RTs (ms) in the study phase.
Experiment Study duration (ms)
40 150 250 350 500 1900 2000 2250
1a – – 691 (22) – – – – 682 (26)
1b – – 708 (20) – – – – 705 (17)
2a – – 733 (35) – – – – 761 (47)
2b – – 955 (67) – – – – 991 (83)
3a 698 (27) 647 (17) 648 (18) 639 (16) 638 (19) 640 (18) – –
3b 704 (27) 653 (19) 669 (17) 661 (18) 649 (19) 678 (27) – –
4 – – 715 (21) – – – 749 (45) –
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. A dash indicates that this condition was not included in the experiment.
Table 4
Mean percentage of classification errors in the study phase.
Experiment Study duration (ms)
40 150 250 350 500 1900 2250
1a – – 8.09 (1.67) – – – 8.26 (2.28)
1b – – 5.35 (1.14) – – – 7.41 (1.22)
2a – – 4.80 (0.69) – – – 5.22 (0.61)
2b – – 7.11 (1.34) – – – 5.55 (1.34)
3a 23.51 (2.27) 9.88 (1.92) 9.49 (1.40) 9.10 (1.72) 8.73 (1.42) 8.24 (1.08) –
3b 28.63 (2.64) 10.46 (1.35) 9.17 (1.28) 11.75 (1.51) 7.70 (1.18) 11.92 (1.97) –
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. A dash indicates that this condition was not included in the experiment.
Table 5
Mean error rate (%) in the test phase.
Experiment and task Study duration (ms)
New 40 150 250 350 500 1900 2000 2250
1a Classification 5.79 (0.94) – – 6.09 (1.19) – – – – 5.55 (0.91)
1b CID-R 1.20 (0.49) – – 1.04 (0.79) – – – – 1.32 (0.42)
2a Classification 8.28 (0.91) – – 5.22 (0.65) – – – – 6.93 (0.94)
2b CID-R 4.41 (0.92) – – 4.61 (1.18) – – – – 4.62 (1.06)
3a Classification 6.42 (1.00) 5.12 (0.79) 5.03 (0.82) 5.35 (1.16) 5.02 (1.22) 5.18 (1.15) 4.87 (1.05) – –
3b CID-R 2.35 (0.63) 2.19 (0.51) 2.17 (0.60) 1.53 (0.46) 1.58 (0.53) 1.07 (0.30) 1.21 (0.37) – –
4 Classification 7.45 (1.49) – – 6.17 (1.57) – – – 5.48 (1.34) –
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. A dash indicates that this condition was not included in the experiment.
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sented, thereby ensuring that every item was overtly classified in
the study phase.
Method
Participants
There were 32 participants in Experiment 2a (26 female, mean
age = 20.8 years, SD = 3.2 years) and 18 participants in Experiment
2b (6 female, mean age = 20.6 years, SD = 1.7 years).
Materials and procedure
Experiments 2a and 2b were identical to Experiments 1a and 1b
except that the study phase procedure was modified so that a clas-
sification response was collected for every item in the study phase.
At the start of each study trial a ‘‘+” was shown for 500 ms. The
stimulus was then presented for 250 ms or 2250 ms, and the mask
was then presented for 2250 ms or 250 ms, followed by a blank
screen. If no response had been made by the time the mask presen-
tation had terminated then the programme waited for the partici-
pant to make a classification response before advancing. There was
an inter-trial interval of 750 ms during which a blank screen was
presented.Results for Experiment 2a
The proportion of study trials that were removed because the
RT was an outlier was low (M = 1.92%, SD = 1.09). Similarly, the
proportion of test trials that were excluded because the RT was
an outlier was low (M = 1.68%, SD = 0.89).
As found in Experiment 1a, the magnitude of priming did not
significantly differ between the 250 ms (M = 44 ms, SE = 10) and
2250 ms (M = 64 ms, SE = 13) study exposure duration conditions,
t(31) = 1.70, p = 0.10, dz = 0.30 (Fig. 1c and Table 1), although the
mean priming effect was numerically greater in the 2250 ms con-
dition (shown by 19 out of 32 participants). Also, as in Experiment
1a, the recognition hit rate was significantly greater in the 2250 ms
condition than the 250 ms condition, t(31) = 9.46, p < 0.001,
dz = 1.67 (Fig. 1d and Table 2) (shown by 29 out of 32 participants).
Priming was reliable (i.e., >0 ms) in both the 250 ms, t(31) = 4.50, p
< 0.001, and 2250 ms, t(31) = 4.84, p < 0.001, conditions. The hit
rate was also significantly greater than the false alarm rate in both
the 250 ms, t(31) = 26.24, p < 0.001, and 2250 ms, t(31) = 30.14, p <
0.001, conditions, indicating that participants could discriminate
old from new items.
In the study phase, there was no significant difference between
RTs to items in the 250 ms and 2250 ms conditions, t(31) = 0.97,
Fig. 2. Results relevant to Predictions 2 and 3 of the single-systemmodel. The top row shows the results from Experiments 1a (panel a), 2a (panel c) and 3a (panel e) that used
the classification task to measure priming. The bottom row shows the results from Experiments 1b (panel b), 2b (panel d) and 3b (panel f) in which a CID-R task was used to
measure priming. The bars denote the experimental data and error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Open circles denote the mean of the expected model results across
participants. Relevant to Prediction 2 is the difference between the mean RT to items in the priming task for misses and hits (M – H) and the difference in the mean RT for
correct rejections and false alarms (CR – FA). Relevant to Prediction 3 is the difference in the mean priming effect and the priming effect for items judged new (P – PJn) (where
the priming effect for items judged new is calculated as the mean RT for correct rejections minus the mean RT for misses). The old item stimuli condition is given in
parentheses (e.g., 250 ms).
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the percentage of classification errors between conditions, t(31) =
0.49, p = 0.63 (Table 4). Unlike in Experiment 1a, there was a sig-
nificant difference between the percentage of classification errors
to items in the new, 250 ms, and 2250 ms conditions at test, F
(1.99, 61.58) = 6.73, p = 0.002 (Table 5). This was primarily driven
by the difference in error rates between the new and 250 ms con-
ditions (p < 0.001), and there was no reliable difference in the error
rates between the new and 2250 ms conditions (p = 0.12) or the
250 ms and 2250 ms conditions (p = 0.057). Given that the differ-
ence in error rates to the 250 ms and new items was unexpected
and was not found in any other experiment, it is not given further
consideration.
Classification RTs at test were analysed according to the recog-
nition outcome in order to test Predictions 2 and 3 of the single-
system model. One participant was excluded from this analysis
for having zero responses in at least one of the hit, miss, false
alarm, or correct rejection categories. As in Experiment 1a, RTs to
hits did not significantly differ from misses in either the 250 ms,
t(30) = 1.28, p = 0.11, or 2250 ms, t(30) = 0.86, p = 0.40, conditions
(see Fig. 2c); the effects (M = 28 ms, 95% CI [17, 74], and M = 27ms, 95% CI [36, 90], respectively) only weakly supported Predic-
tion 2. RTs to false alarms also did not differ from those of correct
rejections, t(30) = 0.10, p = 0.93, which does not support Predic-
tion 2. Priming for items judged new was not reliable in either
the 250 ms condition, t(30) = 0.75, p = 0.46 (M = 13 ms, SE = 17),
or the 2250 ms condition, t(30) = 1.06, p = 0.30 (M = 31 ms, SE =
29). The priming effect did not differ from the priming effect for
items judged new in either the 250 ms, t(30) = 1.68, p = 0.10, or
2250 ms conditions, t(30) = 0.92, p = 0.37; the effects (M = 26
ms, 95% CI [6, 57] and M = 26 ms, 95% CI [32, 84], respectively)
only weakly supported Prediction 3.
Results for Experiment 2b
A small proportion of trials were excluded from the analysis of
the study phase because the RT was an outlier (M = 1.50%, SD =
0.89). The proportion of trials that were excluded from the analysis
of the test phase because no key press was made before the termi-
nation of the clarification procedure was low (M = 2.00%, SD =
3.86). A furtherM = 3.03% (SD = 4.45) of the remaining trials at test
were excluded because the RT was an outlier. The number of trials
Fig. 3. Mean priming effect and recognition hit rate as a function of study duration in Experiment 1b (panels a and b), Experiment 2b (panels c and d), and Experiment 3b
(panels e and f). A CID-R task was used to measure priming in these experiments. The bars denote the experimental data and error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Open
circles denote the mean of the expected model results across participants. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
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also low (M < 5% in each condition, Table 5) and did not signifi-
cantly differ between new, 250 ms, and 2250 ms conditions, F < 1.
As found in Experiment 1b, priming was significantly greater in
the 2250 ms (M = 399 ms, SE = 56) condition than the 250 ms con-
dition (M = 264 ms, SE = 43), t(17) = 2.60, p = 0.019, dz = 0.61 (and
greater in 12 out of 18 participants) (Fig. 3c and Table 1). Likewise,
the hit rate was significantly greater in the 2250 ms condition than
the 250 ms condition, t(17) = 2.15, p = 0.047, dz = 0.51 (being
greater in 12 out of 18 participants) (Fig. 3d and Table 2). The prim-
ing effect was reliable (>0 ms) in both the 250 ms, t(17) = 6.16, p <
0.001, and 2250 ms, t(17) = 7.08, p < 0.001, conditions. The hit rate
was greater than the false alarm rate in both the 250 ms, t(17) =
7.35, p < 0.001, and 2250 ms conditions, t(17) = 8.12, p < 0.001.
In the study phase, there was no significant difference in classifica-
tion RTs between the 250 ms and 2250 ms conditions (Table 3), t
(17) = 0.81, p = 0.43, nor was there a significant difference in the
percentage of classification errors (Table 4), t(17) = 1.16, p = 0.26.
When RTs were analysed according to the recognition outcome,
RTs to hits significantly differed from misses in the 2250 ms condi-
tion, t(17) = 2.19, p = 0.043, supporting Prediction 2 of the model,
but this was not the case in the 250 ms condition, t(17) = 1.34, p =
0.20 (Fig. 2d); the effect in this condition (M = 108 ms, 95% CI [62,
279]) only very weakly supported Prediction 2. RTs to correct
rejections also did not significantly differ from those of false
alarms, t(17) = 0.39, p = 0.70; the effect (M = 59 ms, 95% CI
[261, 378]) only weakly supported Prediction 2. Thus, therewas only partial support for Prediction 2. Priming for items judged
new was significant (i.e., > 0 ms) in both the 250 ms, t(17) = 3.65, p
= 0.001 (M = 233ms, SE = 64), and 2250 ms, t(17) = 3.03, p = 0.01 (M
= 239 ms, SE = 79), conditions. Finally, despite numerical trends,
the priming effect was not significantly greater than the priming
effect for items judged new in either the 2250 ms condition,
t(17) = 2.01, p = 0.061, or the 250 ms condition, t(17) = 0.51,
p = 0.62; the effects (M = 160 ms, 95% CI [8, 328] and M = 30
ms, 95% CI [96, 156], respectively) only weakly supported
Prediction 3.
Discussion
The recognition and priming results of Experiments 2a and 2b
replicated those of Experiments 1a and 1b, but with a refined study
procedure that ensured that every item was classified at study.
Recognition was greater for items in the 2250 ms condition than
the 250 ms condition; priming did not reliably differ between
the 250 ms and 2250 ms conditions in the classification task
(Experiment 2a), but was significantly greater in the 2250 ms con-
dition than the 250 ms condition when measured using a CID-R
task (Experiment 2b). Thus, as in Experiments 1a and 1b, Predic-
tion 1 of the single-system model was confirmed with the CID-R
task, but not the classification task. Predictions 2 and 3 were not
confirmed in the classification task. There were numerical trends
in support of Predictions 2 and 3 in the CID-R task, but only one
result concerning Prediction 2 was significant.
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The aim of Experiments 3a and 3b was to address the possibility
that opposite effects of study duration on recognition and priming
might become evident when a wider range of study durations is
used than in Experiments 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b. This is important to
address for two reasons: first, the duration of the long study dura-
tion condition in Experiments 1 and 2 (2250 ms) differed from the
duration of the long condition used by Voss and Gonsalves (2010)
(2000 ms), and it is possible that Voss and Gonsalves’ results would
have been replicated had a duration closer to 2000 ms been used in
the long condition. Second, Zago et al. (2005) found evidence to
suggest that the function relating exposure duration to priming
can be inverse U-shaped. They found that priming increased as
study duration increased from 40 ms to 250 ms and then fell as
study duration increased further to 1900 ms. If it existed, this kind
of inverse U-shaped relationship would, of course, be missed in our
previous experiments because only two study duration conditions
were used. It could be argued that consideration of a greater num-
ber of study durations would allow for the true (non-montonically
increasing) nature of the function relating study duration to prim-
ing to be revealed, and that this function may not be the same for
recognition. Accordingly, in order to determine whether evidence
for a dissociation would be found when a wider range of study
durations was used, Experiments 3a and 3b were very similar to
Experiments 1a and 1b except that six different study durations
were used (i.e., 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, and
1900 ms, as were used in Zago et al., 2005).Method
Participants
There were 30 participants in Experiment 3a (28 female, mean
age = 20.5 years, SD = 3.0 years) and 30 participants in Experiment
3b (27 female, mean age = 20.3 years, SD = 3.5 years). One partic-
ipant from Experiment 3a was excluded from the analysis for mak-
ing a high proportion of classification errors during the test phase
(67% errors). Another participant was excluded from the analysis of
Experiment 3b for failing to follow instructions in the study phase
(no key press responses were recorded).Materials and procedure
The stimuli were 425 pictures of objects, taken from the same
set of stimuli used by Zago et al. (2005); each subtended approxi-
mately 3 degrees of visual angle in the horizontal and vertical
dimensions. There were six study duration conditions (40 ms,
150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, or 1900 ms) and a new item con-
dition. For each participant, sixty items were randomly assigned to
each of these conditions. A further five items were used on practice
trials for the study phase. There were 10 masks, which were ran-
domly assigned to the study trials with the constraint that each
of the 10 masks appeared an equal number of times across study
trials. The stimulus-plus-mask duration was always 2000 ms for
each trial (as in Zago et al., 2005). Trials were presented in a con-
tinuous stream as in Experiment 1a and Zago et al. (2005). The test
phase procedure of Experiment 3a was the same as Experiments 1a
and 2a and all studied and new items were presented in this phase
(totalling 420 trials). Trials were arranged into 6 blocks of equal
length, and an equal number of new trials were presented in each
block.
The materials and procedure in Experiment 3b were identical to
those in Experiment 3a except that the CID-R task was used to
measure priming at test and thirty items, rather than sixty were
randomly assigned to each of the 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350
ms, 500 ms, and 1900 ms conditions. Fewer items were usedbecause of the tendency for CID trials to be longer, and this pre-
vented this phase from being overly long, relative to the classifica-
tion task. There were therefore 210 trials in total at test in
Experiment 3b.
Results for Experiment 3a
A small proportion of trials were excluded from analysis of the
study phase because no key press response was made during the
trial (M = 6.62%, SD = 6.27). Of the remaining study trials, a small
proportion were excluded because the RT was an outlier (M =
2.96%, SD = 2.43). The proportion of trials that were excluded from
analysis of the test phase because the RT was an outlier was simi-
larly low (M = 1.84%, SD = 1.49).
The magnitude of priming tended to increase across the 40 ms,
150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, and 1900 ms conditions, as indi-
cated by a significant repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA), F(3.96, 110.91) = 3.52, p = 0.01, gp2 = 0.11, and significant
linear trend, F(1, 28) = 13.67, p = 0.001 (Table 1 and Fig. 1e). Focuss-
ing on the 250 ms and 1900 ms conditions in particular, because
these two conditions are the most similar to those of Experiments
1a and 1b, the priming effect was significantly greater in the 1900
ms condition (M = 72 ms, SE = 19) than the 250 ms condition (M =
36 ms, SE = 18), t(28) = 2.21, p = 0.036, dz = 0.41 (shown by 18 out of
29 participants). Priming was also reliable (i.e., >0 ms) in all condi-
tions, ts > 2.48, ps < 0.02, except in the 40ms condition, t(28) = 1.17,
p = 0.27, and was only marginally significant in the 250 ms condi-
tion, t(28) = 2.02, p = 0.053.
With regards to the recognition data, the hit rate tended to
increase across the 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, and
1900 ms conditions, F(2.13, 59.63) = 86.44, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.76
(Table 2 and Fig. 1f). The linear trend was also significant, F(1,
28) = 141.12, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.83. The hit rate was significantly
greater than the false alarm rate in all study duration conditions
(ts > 3.22, ps < 0.003), indicating that recognition memory was reli-
able in all conditions. As with the priming data, the hit rate for the
1900 ms condition was greater than that of the 250 ms condition, t
(28) = 6.82, p < 0.001, dz = 1.27 (in 27 out of 29 participants). Thus,
in this experiment, Prediction 1 of the model was confirmed in the
classification task.
There was a significant difference in the percentage of classifi-
cation errors made in the 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500
ms, or 1900 ms conditions at study, F(2.26, 63.35) = 39.66, p <
0.001 (Table 4). This appeared to be driven by the high percentage
of errors in the 40 ms condition and when this condition was
removed from the analysis the difference in the error rate in the
remaining conditions was not significant, F < 1. Similarly, there
was a significant difference in the RTs to items across conditions
in the study phase, F(2.02, 56.47) = 10.22, p < 0.001, but this
reflected the longer RTs in the 40 ms condition and again this dif-
ference was not significant when the 40 ms condition was
excluded from the analysis, F < 1 (Table 3). In the test phase, there
was no significant difference in the percentage of classification
errors made in the new, 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms,
and 1900 ms conditions, F(3.86, 108.05) = 0.09, p = 0.99 (Table 5).
When RTs were analysed according to the recognition outcome,
no significant differences were found between the items judged
old and new within the new, 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms,
500 ms or 1900 ms conditions (ts < 1.91, ps > 0.067) (Fig. 2e).
The effects in the 40 ms (M = 11 ms, 95% CI [53, 31]) and new
(M = 0 ms, 95% CI [55, 55]) conditions did not support Prediction
2, whereas the effects in the 150 ms (M = 27 ms, 95% CI [24, 77]),
250 ms (M = 45 ms, 95% CI [3, 94]), 350 ms (M = 50 ms, 95% CI
[5, 106]), 500 ms (M = 29 ms, 95% CI [24, 81]), and 1900 ms
(M = 21 ms, 95% CI [35, 77]) conditions weakly supported Predic-
tion 2. There was no significant difference between RTs to correct
3 Identification RTs tended to be longer in Experiment 3b than Experiments 1b and
2b (Table 1). This is likely due to (1) the size of the stimuli being smaller, which may
have made identification more difficult, and (2) the longer duration of the
experiment, arising from the greater number of trials in the study and test phases
which may have impacted upon levels of motivation/fatigue in participants.
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1.88, ps > 0.07), and the priming effect did not significantly differ
from the priming effect for items judged new in any of the condi-
tions (ts < 1.71, ps > 0.10); the effect in the 40 ms condition (M = 7
ms, 95% CI [25, 12]) did not support Prediction 3, whereas the
effects in the 150 ms (M = 15 ms, 95% CI [17, 46]), 250 ms
(M = 27 ms, 95% CI [8, 62]), 350 ms (M = 35 ms, 95% CI [7,
78]), 500 ms (M = 24 ms, 95% CI [13, 60]), and 1900 ms (M = 15
ms, 95% CI [29, 59]) conditions only very weakly supported Pre-
diction 3.
Results for Experiment 3b
A proportion of study trials could not be analysed because no
key press response was made during the trial (M = 10.77%, SD =
7.54). Of the remaining study trials, a small proportion were not
analysed because the RT was an outlier (M = 2.42%, SD = 1.19).
For the test phase, the proportion of trials that were excluded from
the analysis because no key press was made before the termination
of the clarification phase was low (M = 3.40%, SD = 4.74; seeMethod
section), as was the proportion of the remaining test trials that
were excluded because the RT was an outlier (M = 0.92%, SD =
0.66). The number of test trials excluded because the item was
incorrectly identified was very low (M < 2.5% in each condition;
Table 5) and did not significantly differ between conditions, F
(4.58, 128.34) = 1.20, p = 0.31.
The priming effect tended to increase across the 40 ms, 150 ms,
250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, and 1900 ms conditions (Fig. 3e, Table 1),
and this was confirmed by a significant repeated-measures
ANOVA, F(4.08, 114.12) = 13.05, p < 0.001,gp2 = 0.32, and significant
linear trend F(1, 28) = 47.27, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.32. The quadratic and
cubic trends were also significant (Fs(1, 28) > 9.61, ps < 0.005,
though see below). Priming was reliable (greater than zero) in
the 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, and 1900 ms conditions, ts
> 4.95, ps < 0.001, but not in the 40 ms condition, t(28) = 0.64, p
= 0.53. When the 40 ms exposure duration condition was excluded
in the repeated-measures ANOVA, the overall ANOVA was no
longer significant, F(3.53, 98.7) = 2.02, p = 0.11, the linear trend
was only marginally significant, F(1, 28) = 3.70, p = 0.065, and
the quadratic and cubic trends were no longer significant, F(1,
28) = 0.44, p = 0.51, and F(1,28) = 1.76, p = 0.20, respectively.
Focussing again on the 250 ms and 1900 ms conditions, although
priming was numerically greater in the 1900 ms condition (M =
430 ms, SE = 63, vs. M = 385 ms, SE = 56), the difference was not
significant, t(28) = 0.87, p = 0.39, dz = 0.16 (only 14 out of 29 par-
ticipants showed greater priming in the 1900 ms than the 250 ms
condition).
In the recognition memory data, the hit rate also tended to
increase across the 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, and
1900ms conditions, F(2.59, 72.46) = 25.54, p < 0.001,gp2 = 0.48 (lin-
ear trend: F(1, 28) = 37.58, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.57) (Fig. 3f, Table 2).
The quadratic and cubic trend components were also significant
(Fs(1, 28) > 22.09, ps < 0.001; though see below). However, in the
40 ms condition, as with the priming data, the hit rate was not sig-
nificantly greater than the false alarm rate, t(28) = 0.60, p = 0.55,
which indicated that recognition memory was no better than
chance for these items. The hit rate in the 150 ms, 250 ms, 350
ms, 500 ms, and 1900 ms conditions was, however, significantly
greater than the false alarm rate (ts > 5.67, ps < 0.001). When the
40 ms condition was excluded from the analysis of differences in
the hit rate between conditions, the difference between the 150
ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, and 1900 ms conditions remained sig-
nificant, F(3.12, 87.40) = 2.84, p = 0.04, as did the linear trend, F(1,
28) = 8.00, p = 0.009, but not the quadratic, F(1, 28) = 0.095, p =
0.76, or cubic, F(1, 28) = 1.21, p = 0.28, trends. Again, comparing
the 250 ms and 1900 ms conditions, although the hit rate in the1900 ms condition was numerically greater than that of the 250
ms condition, the difference was not significant, t(28) = 1.55, p =
0.13, dz = 0.29 (being greater for 17 out of 29 participants).
There was a significant difference in RTs to items at study across
the 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, and 1900 ms condi-
tions, F(2.76, 77.34) = 3.20, p = 0.031 (Table 3). As in Experiment
3a, this appeared to be largely driven by the generally longer RTs
to items in the 40 ms condition, and the ANOVA was not significant
when this condition was excluded, F(2.27, 63.60) = 1.47, p = 0.24.
Similarly, there was also a significant difference in the percentage
of classification errors made across conditions at study, F(2.71,
75.76) = 27.76, p < 0.001 (Table 4). Again, this was largely driven
by the high percentage of errors in the 40 ms condition, and the
ANOVA was not significant when this condition was removed from
the analysis, F(3.31, 92.78) = 2.51, p = 0.058.3
For the analysis of RTs according to the recognition judgment,
three participants were not included in this analysis because at
least one of the hit, miss, false alarm or correct rejection response
categories had zero responses. RTs were faster for items judged old
in the new item condition, t(25) = 2.48, p = 0.02, and also the 40 ms,
t(25) = 3.39, p = 0.002, 250 ms, t(25) = 2.79, p = 0.01, 350 ms, t(25) =
2.15, p = 0.042, and 1900 ms conditions, t(25) = 2.26, p = 0.033,
offering some support for Prediction 2 of the model (as shown in
Fig. 2f). There was, however, no reliable difference in RTs to items
judged old or new in the 150 ms, t(25) = 0.93, p = 0.36, or 500 ms, t
(25) = 0.46, p = 0.65, conditions; the effect in these conditions (M =
111 ms, 95% CI [135, 356], and M = 42 ms, 95% CI [145, 229],
respectively) only weakly supported Prediction 2 of the model.
The priming effect for items judged new was significant in the
150 ms, t(25) = 2.39, p = 0.025, 250 ms, t(25) = 2.75, p = 0.011,
500 ms, t(25) = 3.76, p = 0.001, and 1900 ms, t(25) = 2.54, p =
0.018, conditions, but not in the 40 ms condition, t(25) = 0.50, p
= 0.62, or 350 ms condition, t(25) = 1.95, p = 0.063. The only con-
dition in which the priming effect was greater than the priming
effect for items judged new (relevant to Prediction 3 of the model)
was the 250 ms condition, t(25) = 2.55, p = 0.017 (all other ts < 1.75,
ps > 0.093); the effects in the 40 ms (M = 75 ms, 95% CI [18, 168]),
150 ms (M = 53 ms, 95% CI [-67, 172]), 350 ms (M = 109 ms, 95% CI
[59, 276]), 500 ms (M = 10 ms, 95% CI [113, 133]), and 1900 ms
(M = 146 ms, 95% CI [26, 317]) conditions only weakly supported
Prediction 3.
Discussion
As in the previous experiments, no evidence was found in
Experiments 3a and 3b to support the claim that varying study
duration has opposite effects on recognition and priming. To the
contrary, both recognition and priming significantly increased
across the 40–1900 ms study duration conditions in the classifica-
tion and CID-R tasks, supporting Prediction 1 of the model. In the
classification task, priming for items in the longest study duration
condition (1900 ms) was also significantly greater than priming for
items presented for 250 ms (Experiment 3a). The lack of a signifi-
cant difference between priming in the 1900 ms and 250 ms con-
ditions using the CID-R task (Experiment 3b), contrasts with the
findings of Experiments 1b and 2b where a significant difference
was found. This may be due to lower power arising from the smal-
ler number of stimuli used in Experiment 3b. The function relating
priming and recognition to study duration was found to be a
monotonically increasing one, rather than an inverse U shaped,
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findings are considered in greater detail in the General Discussion.
Finally, once again, Predictions 2 and 3 of the single-system model
were not supported in the classification task, but there was some
support for these predictions in the CID-R task.Discussion of Experiments 1–3
It is important to consider potential reasons why the priming
results from Experiments 1–3 so far did not replicate those of
Voss and Gonsalves (2010). A power analysis was conducted to
determine whether Experiments 1–3 possessed sufficient power
to detect the priming difference reported in Voss and Gonsalves
(2010). Using the results reported in Voss and Gonsalves, the effect
of study duration on priming in their study was estimated to be
relatively large (Cohen’s dz = t/
p
N = 3.2/
p
14 = 0.855). The power
of each individual experiment was very high (all greater than
0.93, two-tailed test). For comparison, the effect of duration on
the recognition hit rate was estimated to be only slightly larger
(Cohen’s dz = t/
p
N = 4.8/
p
14 = 1.28). Thus, low power is unlikely
to be the cause of the failure to replicate the priming results of Voss
and Gonsalves.
Although the design we used was similar, the methodological
differences between our experiments and Voss and Gonsalves’
may have contributed to the discrepancy in results. First, there
were fewer items in each condition of our experiments. In the
experiment by Voss and Gonsalves, there were 85 items in the brief
and long conditions at encoding (and 150 new items at test),
whereas there were 48 items in the 250 ms and 2250 ms condi-
tions in Experiments 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, 60 items in the 250 ms
and 1900 ms conditions of Experiment 3a, and only 30 in these
conditions in Experiment 3b. The stimuli were also not identical
to those used by Voss and Gonsalves: the stimuli in Experiments
1 and 2 were obtained from image searches on the internet, and
those in Experiment 3 were taken from the study by Zago et al.
(2005). The stimuli were also of different dimensions.
Another possible reason for the discrepancy in findings is that
participants in Experiments 1–3 were generally slower to respond
in the classification task compared to participants in Voss and Gon-
salves’ study. Pooling the data from Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a, the
mean RT to new items was 976 ms (SD = 313) whereas the mean
RT to new items was 627 ms (SD = 161) in Voss and Gonsalves’
study.4 Average RTs to new items were also faster in Zago et al.
(2005) (696 ms and 770 ms in their block- and event-related designs,
respectively). It could be argued that the generally longer RTs shown
by participants in our study meant that there was more opportunity
for their responses in the priming task to be contaminated by expli-
cit memory. Explicit memory increased with study duration (indi-
cated by recognition performance), and if contamination was
occurring, priming might also be expected to increase with study
duration. There are, however, a number of reasons to expect that
explicit contamination did not occur: first, the test phase instruc-
tions for the classification task encouraged rapid responding, as in
Voss and Gonsalves’ study, meaning that there would have been lim-
ited time for contamination to occur. Moreover, a speeded classifica-4 Though it is worth bearing in mind that items with RTs less than 200 ms or
greater than three standard deviations from a participant’s mean RT were not
included in the analysis of Experiments 1–3 (as in Berry et al., 2012; see Methods).
Voss and Gonsalves (2010) screened RTs by calculating the RT mean and SD for each
participant and then removing individual trials if the RT was greater than two
standard deviations from the mean RT for the participant collapsed across all
conditions (separately for study and test) (J. Voss, personal communication, 2016).
These differences in the screening of RTs between studies, and also the fact that trials
at test only advanced once a response was made, rather than automatically (as in Voss
& Gonsalves, 2010), may of course account for the slightly longer baseline RTs in
Experiments 1–3.tion decision is arguably less cognitively demanding than a strategy
based on recollection (e.g., MacLeod, 2008), meaning that it is unli-
kely that participants would have opted to engage in such a strategy.
It is true, however, that we instructed participants not to sacrifice
accuracy when responding quickly at test, whereas Voss and
Gonsalves (2010) did not, and this difference may be important. Sec-
ond, even under circumstances designed to encourage contamina-
tion of priming responses by explicit memory in similar tasks
(with interleaved identification and recognition trials), contamina-
tion of priming with the use of an explicit strategy has not been
found (Ward et al., 2013b). Third, the idea that explicit contamina-
tion was more likely to have occurred in our experiments would
seem more plausible if levels of recognition were greater than
reported by Voss and Gonsalves (2010). This would indicate a greater
availability of information in explicit memory for retrieval. Levels of
recognition were, however, comparable to those obtained by Voss
and Gonsalves (2010), and, if anything, in many experiments were
slightly lower (as indicated by the hit rate minus the false alarm
rate: 0.62 and 0.73 in the brief and long conditions of Voss and Gon-
salves, respectively; see Table 2 for Experiments 1–3).
Fourth, if slower baseline RTs are responsible for the failure to
detect an inverse relationship between study duration and prim-
ing, then we might expect to see evidence of an inverse relation-
ship in responders with baseline RTs comparable to those of
participants in Voss and Gonsalves (2010). This was examined by
collapsing the data across experiments for each task and then par-
titioning the participants into quartiles on the basis of their mean
RT to new items and then calculating the difference in priming to
long and brief items in each quartile. The results are shown in
Table 6. For the classification task data, the mean RT for new items
in the fastest quartile was comparable to (and was if anything fas-
ter than) the mean RT for new items reported in Voss and Gon-
salves (M = 590 ms vs. M = 627 ms). Yet, there was virtually no
difference in priming between long and brief conditions in this
quartile (M priming long M priming brief = 0.69 ms) and, impor-
tantly, there was no reversal in the priming difference here; prim-
ing was, if anything, greater in the long condition (12 out of 23
participants showed a positive difference between long and brief
conditions). There was also no evidence for a reversal in the CID-
R task in the fastest responders.
Clearly, however, in both tasks, the long-minus-brief-priming
difference tended to decrease with the mean RT for new items,
raising the possibility that if the mean RT of new items was even
faster than 590 ms in the classification task, a negative long minus
brief priming difference might emerge (e.g., in a direct replication
that encouraged very fast responding). Although possible, we do
not believe that the association between the duration effect and
baseline RT necessarily implies it. For example, this pattern of
results is consistent with the findings of Ostergaard (1998), who
found that independent variables such as the number of repeti-
tions at encoding, word-frequency, and retention interval had no
effect on the magnitude of subsequent priming when baseline
RTs were fast, but effects of these variables emerged when baseline
RTs were longer. Rather than explain this in terms of the differen-
tial engagement of explicit and implicit memory systems as base-
line RT varies, Ostergaard (1998) proposed that when baseline RTs
were short, many factors unrelated to memory (e.g., the amount of
perceptual information available from a stimulus at test) domi-
nated responding in the priming task (a word naming task). This
effectively constrained the effects of the independent variables
on priming. When the influence of these factors was reduced
(e.g., by lengthening the stimulus fade-in duration in a gradual
clarification task, thereby increasing perceptual difficulty), there
was more opportunity for the influence of prior exposure to facil-
itate performance in the priming task, and therefore effects of
independent variables on priming could be detected (see also
Table 6
Mean effect of study duration (long condition minus brief condition) on priming (ms) and recognition (hit rate) for each new item RT quartile (SE in parentheses) in Experiments
1–3.
Quartile
1 2 3 4
Classification task
Participants in each quartile 23 23 23 24
M new item RT 590 871 1047 1379
(17) (14) (9) (43)
M Priming (long – brief) 0.69 14.05 6.41 50.43
(8.41) (11.98) (18.18) (18.67)
M Recognition (long – brief) 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
CID-R task
Participants in each quartile 18 18 18 17
M RT new items 2032 2475 2963 3735
(48) (27) (31) (111)
M Priming (long – brief) 40.79 93.42 72.16 137.59
(26.71) (52.05) (67.00) (77.59)
M Recognition (long – brief) 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.08
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Note. The brief condition comprises the data combined across the 250 ms condition from Experiments 1–3. The long condition comprises the data combined across the
2250 ms conditions in Experiments 1 and 2, and 1900 ms (longest) condition in Experiment 3.
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account suggests that there would still be no difference in priming,
even if baseline RTs were below 590 ms on average. In sum, this
analysis suggests that the failure to find that study duration has
opposite effects on priming and recognition in Experiments 1–3
(particularly Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a) is unlikely to be due to
differences in baseline RT between studies.Experiment 4
Given that we cannot exclude the possibility that methodolog-
ical differences to Voss and Gonsalves (2010) in Experiments 1–3
may have been important in driving the differences in results
between studies, Experiment 4 was designed to replicate the beha-
vioural methods of Voss and Gonsalves (2010) as closely as possi-
ble. With the exception of additional methodological controls and
counterbalancing procedures (see below), the only potential sub-
stantive differences to the methods of Voss and Gonsalves (2010)
that we can discern in this experiment are that the stimuli and par-
ticipants are not the same.5 The methods and analysis plan were
registered prior to data collection (with the Open Science Frame-
work, https://osf.io/xfqt6) (any unplanned analyses are indicated
as such in parentheses).Method
Participants
40 individuals participated (37 female, 18–25 years of age). This
particular sample size was selected because it is at least 2.5 times
that of Voss and Gonsalves (2010) (N = 14), and so would give the
experiment at least 80% power to detect an effect size that would
give the original Voss and Gonsalves (2010) study 33% power
(Simonsohn, 2015). This sample size also allowed for counterbal-
ancing of stimuli and responses (see below). All participants were
native English speakers, right-handed, and between 18–25 years of5 The images in our stimulus pool were selected so that they were relatively
unambiguous with regards to whether they depicted a natural or manufactured
object. We wanted to control for this as much as possible because in Voss and
Gonsalves’ (2010) study a classification response to an item was scored as correct if i
matched the modal response for that item across participants, which implies a degree
of ambiguity in the objective classification of their stimuli. Only one stimulus in
Experiment 4 differed in terms of its objective and modal classification at test.
6 Although the presentation of this fixation is not mentioned in the Materials and
Methods section of Voss and Gonsalves (2010), a brief fixation separating trials was
used in their study phase (B. Gonsalves, personal communication, 2016).tage. (In Voss and Gonsalves, the participants were right-handed
and between 18–24 years of age, but whether participants were
native English speakers was not specified.) The participants were
recruited from a University of Plymouth participant pool, and took
part in exchange for course credit.
Materials
The stimuli were 320 colour images. Each image consisted of a
photograph of a nameable, familiar object against a white back-
ground. The images were selected from the stimulus pool provided
by Brodeur, Guérard, and Bouras (2014) and the stimuli used by
Zago et al. (2005). The objects in the stimulus pool were different
from one another. Each image was sized to fit into a square sub-
tending 4 degrees of the visual angle (from a viewing distance of
approximately 50 cm). Half of the images were natural (e.g., an
apple, wheat, a moth) and half were manufactured (e.g., a bed, a
chair, a guitar). As in Voss and Gonsalves (2010), the assignment
of stimuli to the brief and long conditions was counterbalanced
across participants and approximately half of the items in each
condition were manufactured. The mask was composed of random
elements of objects not in the main stimulus pool and had the
same size dimensions as the stimuli. A four-button response box
with millisecond response time accuracy was used to collect but-
ton press responses.
Procedure
On each trial in the study phase, an itemwas presented and was
then immediately followed by the mask. Items in the brief condi-
tion were presented for 250 ms, and items in the long condition
were presented for 2000 ms. The mask was presented for 2250
ms following a brief item, and was presented for 500 ms following
a long item. Thus, the combined duration of the stimulus and the
mask on each trial was 2500 ms. Immediately following the pre-
sentation of the mask, a central fixation (+) was presented for
500 ms.6 As in Voss and Gonsalves (2010), participants were
instructed to categorise each object as natural or manufactured by
pressing one of two buttons. Speed was not emphasised for this
response, and participants were told that they should respond on
the basis of their initial impression of the category, and that there
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85 long). The order of presentation of trials was randomized for each
participant.
A retention interval of approximately 3 min followed the study
phase, during which participants read instructions for the test
phase. There were 320 trials in the test phase, comprising 85 brief
items, 85 long items, and 150 new items. On each trial in the test
phase an object was presented for 500 ms, followed by the same
mask that was used in the study phase for 2000 ms. Participants
were told that as soon as they saw the object at test they must cat-
egorize it as natural or manufactured by pressing one of two but-
tons, as in the study phase. As in Voss and Gonsalves (2010),
speed was heavily emphasised for this response. Immediately after
the mask was presented, an ‘R’ (for ‘respond’) was presented in the
centre of the screen for 2000 ms. Participants were told that when
this prompt was presented, they must make a second button press
to indicate whether the object was presented before in the study
phase (i.e., is ‘‘old”) or was not presented before in the experiment
(i.e., is ‘‘new”). They made this response by pressing one of four
buttons corresponding to high confidence old, low confidence
old, low confidence new, and high confidence new. It was empha-
sised to participants that for this response, accuracy was more
important than speed. After the recognition prompt, a 500 ms
break (a blank screen) followed before the next trial. Thus, as in
Voss and Gonsalves (2010), but contrary to Experiments 1–3, test
trials advanced automatically rather than being self-paced.
The order of presentation of trials in the test phase was ran-
domized for each participant. The left and right index fingers were
used for the natural and manufactured responses, and the assign-
ment of responses to these fingers was counterbalanced across
participants. The same assignment of classification responses to
fingers was used at study and test for each participant. For one half
of the participants, the high confidence new, low confidence new,
low confidence old, and high confidence old responses were
assigned to the left middle, left index, right index, and right middle
fingers respectively. For the other half of participants, the high con-
fidence new, low confidence new, low confidence old, and high
confidence old responses were assigned to the right middle, right
index, left index and left middle fingers, respectively.Results
Trials from the study phase were only analysed if a classifica-
tion response had been registered (M = 96.50% of trials, SD =
8.27). Similarly, trials from the test phase were only analysed if
both a classification response and a recognition judgment were
registered (M = 88.22% of trials, SD = 18.02). Trials were also
excluded from the analysis if the RT was greater than the mean
RT plus two times the standard deviation RT, determined sepa-
rately for study and test (study phase, M = 4.15% of trials excluded,
SD = 1.69; test phase, M = 4.99% of trials excluded, SD = 1.05).
In contrast to Experiments 1–3 and Voss and Gonsalves (2010),
the mean classification RT to brief, long, and new items did not sig-
nificantly differ, F(1.56, 60.97) = 0.66, p = 0.49 (Table 1). Planned
paired t-tests comparing brief and long items with new items indi-
cated that there was no priming effect for either type of studied
item (M brief = 7 ms, SE = 5; M long = 1 ms, SE = 7), t(39) = 1.52,
p = 0.14, and t(39) = 0.12, p = 0.91, respectively, nor did RTs to brief
and long items significantly differ, t(39) = 0.80, p = 0.43, dz = 0.13
(the RT to brief items was shorter than the RT to long items in 23
out of 40 participants). The scaled JZS Bayes Factor for the compar-
ison between classification RTs to brief and long items was 4.36 in
favor of the null hypothesis, suggesting that the data are 4.36 times
more likely to be observed under the null hypothesis (unplanned
analysis).The mean classification RT to brief and long items also did not
significantly differ in the study phase, t(39) = 0.87, p = 0.39
(Table 3). Classification accuracy to brief, long and new items
did, however, significantly differ in the test phase (M
brief = 93.83%, SE = 1.57; M long = 94.52%, SE = 1.35; M
new = 92.55%, SE = 1.49; Table 5), F(1.68, 65.69) = 3.72, p = 0.037.
This was unexpected, given our previous results in Experiments
1–3 and the results of Voss and Gonsalves (2010). Hence,
(unplanned) paired t-tests with Bonferroni corrected p-values were
conducted to compare accuracy to the three item types: these indi-
cated that accuracy was significantly greater for long items than
new items, t(39) = 2.86, p = 0.020, but that accuracy for new and
brief items, although greater for brief items, did not significantly
differ, t(39) = 2.09, p = 0.13. Accuracy for brief and long items did
not differ, t(39) = 0.79, p > 0.99.
In contrast to priming, study duration affected recognition, as
indicated by a significant ANOVA comparing the proportion of
old judgments to brief, long, and new items, F(1.22, 47.74) =
106.56, p < 0.001 (Table 2). Planned t-tests indicated that the hit
rate for brief and long items was significantly greater than the false
alarm rate, t(39) = 10.50, p < 0.001, and t(39) = 10.80, p < 0.001,
respectively, and the hit rate for long items was also greater than
for brief items, t(39) = 4.96, p < 0.001, dz = 0.78, indicating that
recognition was better with a longer study duration (29 out of 40
participants showed this effect). Responses were analysed accord-
ing to recognition confidence. A 3 (object: brief, long, new)  4
(recognition response: high confidence old, low confidence old,
low confidence new, high confidence new) within-subjects ANOVA
yielded a significant object  recognition response interaction, F
(2.17, 84.57) = 70.09, p < 0.001. As shown in Table 7, high confi-
dence hits were more prevalent for long items than for brief items,
t(39) = 5.08, p < 0.001. Low confidence hits were similar for long
and brief items, t(39) = 1.93, p = 0.061. High confidence misses
and low confidence misses were more prevalent for brief items
than for long items, t(39) = 3.12, p = 0.003, and t(39) = 3.11, p =
0.003, respectively. This pattern of significance replicates Voss
and Gonsalves (2010).
Recognition for fast and slow classification responses was also
analysed, as in Voss and Gonsalves (2010). A within-subjects med-
ian split on classification RTs divided brief, long, and new trials into
fastest and slowest categories. For brief, long and new item types, a
2 (condition: fastest, slowest)  4 (response: high confidence old,
low confidence old, low confidence new, high confidence new)
repeatedmeasures ANOVAwas carried out on the mean proportion
of recognition endorsements. As shown in Table 8, recognition
accuracy tended to be better for slow responses than fast
responses, and this was confirmed by the presence of a significant
condition  response interaction for brief, F(2.45, 95.34) = 7.85, p <
0.001, and long, F(2.47, 96.15) = 4.42, p = 0.009, items. Voss and
Gonsalves (2010) also found a significant interaction for brief and
long items. Unlike Voss and Gonsalves (2010), the condi-
tion  response interaction for new items was not significant, F
(2.36, 92.18) = 0.83, p = 0.46.
Classification RTs were also analysed according to the recogni-
tion judgment in order to test Predictions 2 and 3 of the model.
Confirmation of these predictions was lacking, as was found in
Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a. There were no significant differences
between classification RTs to items judged old or new within brief,
long or new item types: t(39) = 0.02, p = 0.99, t(39) = 1.99, p =
0.053, and t(39) = 0.15, p = 0.87, respectively (Fig. 4). The priming
effect for items judged new was not significant for brief items (M =
10 ms, SE = 8), t(39) = 1.26, p = 0.22, but was significant for long
items (M = 16 ms, SE = 7), t(39) = 2.17, p = 0.036. The priming effect
did not significantly differ from the priming effect for items judged
new for brief items, t(39) = 0.37, p = 0.71, or long items, t(39) =
1.89, p = 0.067.
Table 7
Mean recognition endorsement rates for high confidence (HC) and low confidence (LC) responses in Experiment 4 (SE in parentheses).
Stimulus type Response type
Old HC Old LC New LC New HC
Brief old 0.45 (0.02) 0.19 (0.01) 0.18 (0.02) 0.18 (0.02)
Long old 0.54 (0.02) 0.17 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.14 (0.02)
New 0.14 (0.02) 0.14 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02) 0.44 (0.03)
Table 8
Mean recognition endorsement rates for high confidence (HC) and low confidence (LC) responses computed as a function of response time (RT) on the priming measure (in ms) in
Experiment 4 (SE in parentheses).
Stimulus type Classification RT Recognition response type
Old HC Old LC New LC New HC
Brief old fastest 584 (23) 0.41 (0.02) 0.21 (0.02) 0.19 (0.02) 0.18 (0.02)
Brief old slowest 938 (45) 0.48 (0.02) 0.16 (0.01) 0.17 (0.02) 0.19 (0.02)
Long old fastest 591 (23) 0.52 (0.03) 0.18 (0.02) 0.16 (0.01) 0.14 (0.02)
Long old slowest 943 (44) 0.57 (0.03) 0.16 (0.02) 0.12 (0.01) 0.15 (0.02)
New fastest 592 (24) 0.14 (0.03) 0.14 (0.01) 0.29 (0.03) 0.43 (0.03)
New slowest 943 (45) 0.14 (0.02) 0.14 (0.01) 0.28 (0.02) 0.45 (0.03)
Fig. 4. Results relevant to Predictions 2 and 3 of the single-system model
(Experiment 4). The bars denote the experimental data and error bars denote 95%
confidence intervals. Open circles denote the mean of the expected model results
across participants. M – H = mean RT for misses minus mean RT for hits; CR –
FA = mean RT for correct rejections minus mean RT for false alarms; P – PJn = Mean
priming effect minus the priming effect for items judged new (where the latter
effect is calculated as mean RT for correct rejections minus the mean RT for misses).
The old item stimuli condition is given in parentheses.
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As found in Experiments 1–3 and also by Voss and Gonsalves
(2010), recognition was greater following a long study duration
than a short one. In contrast to the previous experiments and
Voss and Gonsalves (2010), however, the priming effects for brief
and long items were not significant. There was also no significant
difference in the mean classification RT for brief and long items.
Thus, despite efforts to replicate Voss and Gonsalves (2010) as clo-
sely as possible, and having sufficient power, this experiment did
not replicate their finding that study duration produces opposite
effects on recognition and priming.There were, if anything, indications of priming for long items
and not brief items: classification accuracy was greater for long
than new items, and the priming effect for items judged new
was also reliable for long, but not brief, items. Nevertheless, one
possibility is that the general lack of priming effects in this exper-
iment is because our participants were less motivated than those
in Voss and Gonsalves (2010). Indeed, recognition levels in Exper-
iment 4 were much lower than in Voss and Gonsalves (2010) (hit
minus false alarm rate, brief = 0.35, long = 0.43 in Experiment 4;
vs. brief = 0.62, long = 0.73 in Voss and Gonsalves), and the effect
of study duration on recognition was also smaller than reported
by Voss and Gonsalves (2010) (dz = 0.78 vs. dz = 1.28) (though clas-
sification accuracy for brief, long and new items at test was slightly
higher than in Voss and Gonsalves: 93.83%, 94.52%, 92.55%, respec-
tively, vs. 91.2%, 89.9%, and 91.7%). Perhaps a similar pattern to
Voss and Gonsalves (2010) would be observed in participants with
recognition levels closer to those reported in their study? To inves-
tigate this we examined classification RTs in participants with the
highest recognition scores for long items, as determined by a med-
ian split (the M long item hit minus false alarm rate of this sub-
group = 0.62) (unplanned analysis). Small numerical priming
effects for brief and long items were evident in this group, but
the priming effect was, if anything, greater for long items as indi-
cated by the shorter RTs for these items (M RT new = 751 ms, M
RT brief = 747 ms,M RT long = 731 ms). Similarly, in the half of par-
ticipants with the largest difference in hit rates to long and brief
items (M long item hit rate minus M brief item hit rate = 0.16, dz
= 3.57), the priming effect was, if anything, greater for long items
than brief items, again indicated by the shorter RTs for these items
(M RT new = 711 ms, M RT brief = 715 ms; M RT long = 709 ms)
(unplanned analysis). Thus, there was no indication that the prim-
ing effect for brief items was greater than that of long items in par-
ticipants whose recognition levels were more comparable to Voss
and Gonsalves.
As in Voss and Gonsalves (2010), speed of responding was heav-
ily emphasised at test for the classification response and the same
RT trimming procedures were also followed. Despite this, RTs were
still slower than in Voss and Gonsalves (2010) (M RT new items =
766 ms vs. M RT new items = 627 ms). RTs were, however, faster
than in the earlier experiments that used the classification task
(see Table 1), suggesting that these instructional and procedural
changes did have some effect of speeding RTs. To investigate
whether a similar pattern to Voss and Gonsalves (2010) would
be observed in participants with more comparable RTs to those
Fig. 5. Results from a Bayes factor replication test (Verhagen & Wagenmakers,
2014) applied to the classification task data from Experiment 4. The dotted line
represents the prior distribution, based on the effect size in Voss and Gonsalves
(2010) (priming for brief minus long). The solid line shows the posterior after taking
into account the data from Experiment 4. The white circle and gray square indicate
the ordinate of the prior and posterior distribution, respectively, at the null
hypothesis that the effect size is zero.
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participants with the fastest classification RTs for new items, as
determined by a median split (M RT new = 591 ms) (unplanned
analysis). However, RTs for long items were shorter than
those of brief items in this group (M RT brief = 594 ms;
M RT long = 592 ms).
Finally, a Bayesian analysis was also conducted in order to
determine which outcome of the two studies—that of Experiment
4 or Voss and Gonsalves—should be considered more likely. For
this, the Bayesian replication test described in Verhagen and
Wagenmakers (2014) was used (unplanned analysis). Assuming
that the methods used in Experiments 4 are adequate for the pur-
poses of replicating Voss and Gonsalves’ (2010) result, the Bayesian
replication test assesses the likelihood of obtaining the data from
Experiment 4 under the hypothesis that the brief-minus-long
priming effect size is dz = 0.885 (as found in Voss and Gonsalves)
versus the hypothesis that the effect size is dz = 0.13 (as found in
Experiment 4). The results of this analysis are plotted in Fig. 5.
The curve with a dashed line represents the prior distribution (M
= 0.855, SD = 0.31) for the effect of duration, given the result
reported by Voss and Gonsalves. The curve with the solid black line
represents the posterior distribution (M = 0.28, SD = 0.14) for the
effect of duration after the results of Experiment 4 have been taken
into account. The gray and white dots indicate the ordinates of the
prior and posterior distribution respectively at the hypothesis that
the effect size is zero. The ratio of the heights of these two points
gives the Bayes factor (denoted BFr0 = 0.07 in the figure), indicating
that the data from Experiment 4 are 1/0.07 = 14.3 times more likely
under the null hypothesis of priming for long and brief items being
equal, than under the alternative hypothesis of priming for brief
items being greater than for long items. Thus, even if you believe
the original Voss and Gonsalves (2010) effect then, from a Bayesian
perspective, the new data should lead you to revise your belief so
that the null hypothesis is now more likely than the Voss and Gon-
salves hypothesis.Modelling of Experiments 1–4
The data from Experiments 1–4 were modelled with the single-
system model in order to determine how well it can simultane-
ously account for the main findings. As in previous applications
of the model (e.g., Berry et al., 2012, 2014), numerous parameter
values (from Eqs. (1) and (2)) were fixed to enable identification
of other (key) parameters: mnew, the mean f of new items, was set
to zero, as was M(ep), the mean of the noise associated with the
priming task (Eq. (2)), and also M(er), the mean of the noise associ-
ated with the recognition task (Eq. (1)). rf, the standard deviation
of f, was set to equal
p
0.5; rr, the standard deviation of er, was set
to equal rf (and so rJr =
p
(rf2 + rf2) = 1, which means that m for an
old item condition is therefore equal to d0 for that condition). For
Experiments 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, the model has 6 free parameters:
m250ms, the mean f of items in the 250 ms condition at test;
m2250ms, the mean f value of items in the 2250 ms condition; C,
the criterion of Jr that is required for an ‘‘old” judgment to be made;
b, s, and rp, the standard deviation of ep, which is the noise added
to f for the generation of the RT (in Eq. (2)). For Experiments 3a and
3b, there were 10 free parameters in total: C, b, s, and rp, in addi-
tion to the parameters m40ms, m150ms, m250ms, m350ms, m500ms, m1900ms,
which represent the mean f of the respective old item condition.
For Experiment 4, there were 6 free parameters, as in Experiments
1 and 2, m250ms, m2000ms, C, b, s, and rp.
The parameters of the model were estimated using maximum
likelihood estimation. This involved determining the likelihood of
each recognition judgment (‘‘old” or ‘‘new”) and RT of each item
at test, given particular parameter values of the model. The likeli-hood of each judgment (Z) and response time (RT) combination at
test is given as:
LðZ;RTjXÞ ¼ ½UðCjjlJrjRT;X ;r2JrjRTÞ UðCj1jlJrjRT;X ;r2JrjRTÞ/ðRTjb
 slX ;r2RTÞ
where X = new, 250 ms, 2250 ms for Experiments 1 and 2, X = new,
40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms, 500 ms, 1900 ms for Experiment 3,
and X = new, 250 ms, 2000 ms for Experiment 4; U is the cumula-
tive normal distribution function, j = 1 when Z = ‘‘new”, j = 2 when Z
= ‘‘old”; C0 = 1, C1 = C, C2 = 1; / is the normal density function;
rRT2 = s2rf2 + rp2 (from Eq. (2)); and lJr|RT and r2Jr|RT are the mean
and variance of the conditional distribution of Jr given RT, where:
lJrjRT;X ¼ lX 
sr2f ðRT  bþ slXÞ
s2r2f þr2p
;
and
r2JrjRT ¼ r2f þr2r 
s2r4f
s2r2f þr2p
The parameter values that maximised the summed log-
likelihood across all test phase trials were determined via an auto-
mated search process (goodness-of-fit values are shown in Table 9).
For each experiment, the same participants that were used in the
analysis were also modelled, however, parameters could not be
estimated if a participant had zero responses in any of the hit, miss,
false alarm and correct rejection categories, which meant that
there was 1 participant in Experiment 1a (N = 31), one participant
from Experiment 2a (N = 31), and 3 participants from Experiment
3b (N = 26) that could not be fit by the model. Of the remaining
participants, the same trials that were analysed to produce the
findings in the results sections were also the trials that were fit
by the model (i.e., trials on which the RT was an outlier were
excluded, and incorrectly identified CID-R trials were also
excluded). In total, 5862 trials were fit in Experiment 1a, 4470 tri-
als in Experiment 1b, 5851 trials in Experiment 2a, 3207 trials in
Experiment 2b, 11,956 trials in Experiment 3a, 5139 trials in
Experiment 3b, and 10,732 trials in Experiment 4. One set of
Table 9
Goodness-of-fit values for the single-system model.
Experiment N p q ln(L) AIC BIC
1a 31 6 5862 42515.79 85403.58 86645.36
1b 24 6 4470 38753.24 77794.47 78716.81
2a 31 6 5851 43324.37 87020.74 88262.17
2b 18 6 3207 28155.77 56527.55 57183.44
3a 29 10 11956 94095.95 188771.89 190914.70
3b 26 10 5139 45891.17 92302.34 94003.94
4 40 6 10372 77790.80 156061.60 157809.03
Note. p is the number of free parameters in the model. N is the number of participants who were modelled (who had nonzero hit, miss, false alarm and correct rejection
responses). The AIC (Akaike, 1973) and BIC (Schwarz, 1978) provide a measure of fit to the data. The AIC is calculated as follows: AIC = 2ln(L) + 2Np, where Np is the total
number of free parameters for each fit. The BIC is calculated as follows: = 2ln(L) + Npln(q), where q is the total number of data points fit.
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means of the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters
across individuals are given in Table 10.
Certain trends in the parameter estimates are worth noting:
First, estimates of l tended to increase with study duration. One
exception to this was in Experiment 3b where the estimate of
l350ms was lower than the estimate of l250ms; this reflected the
trend for both priming and recognition in the 250 ms condition
to be slightly greater than in the 350 ms condition. The value of
the response criterion C was fairly consistent across experiments.
The values of b, s and rp tended to be greater for the experiments
using the CID-R task than the classification task, which reflected
the generally longer RTs and greater variance in RTs in this task
(e.g., Table 1, Eq. (2)).
The estimates of the model parameters were used to calculate
expected results of the single-system model. Expected priming
was calculated for each condition as the difference in the expected
RT for new and old items, that is, the expected priming effect = b 
(b  slX) = slX, where X denotes the old item condition (e.g.,
250 ms); the hit rate is calculated as 1  U(C  lX). The expected
RT for hit, miss, false alarm and correct rejection responses is cal-
culated with the formula:
E½RTjZ;X ¼ b slX þ
sr2f
rJr
/
CjlX
rJr
 
 / Cj1lXrJr
 
U CjlXrJr
 
UðCj1lXrJr Þ
where rJr2 = rf2 + rr2, and, again, X = new, 250 ms, 2250 ms for
Experiments 1 and 2, X = new, 40 ms, 150 ms, 250 ms, 350 ms,
500 ms, 1900 ms for Experiment 3, and X = new, 250 ms, 2000
ms for Experiment 4; j = 1 when Z = ‘‘new”, j = 2 when Z = ‘‘old”;
C0 = 1, C1 = C, C2 = 1. The formula gives the expected RT for false
alarms when Z = ‘‘old” and X = new, and the expected RT for correct
rejections when Z = ‘‘new” and X = new. The expected RT for hits
and misses is then given when Z = ‘‘old” and Z = ‘‘new”, respectively,
and X is the relevant old item condition (e.g., 250 ms). The differ-
ence in the expected RT for hits and misses and the difference
between the expected RT for correct rejections and false alarms
can then be calculated, and the mean expected difference is plotted
alongside the data in Figs. 2 and 4. Also plotted in Figs. 2 and 4 is the
expected difference in the magnitude of the priming effect and the
priming effect for items judged new, which can be calculated for
each old item condition as slX  (E[RT| Z = ‘‘new”, X = new]  E
[RT| Z = ‘‘new”, X = old]). Expected values were calculated for each
individual, and the mean of the expected values across participants
is plotted as open circles in Figs. 1–4.
The model successfully reproduced the major patterns in the
data: the predicted effects of study duration were qualitatively
similar for recognition and priming (Figs. 1 and 3). Pooling the
model data from the 250 ms conditions and longest duration con-
ditions from Experiments 1–4, the magnitude of the predicted
effect on priming also tended to be smaller than the effect on
recognition (classification task: priming dz = 0.46 vs. recognitiondz = 1.17; CID-R task: priming dz = 0.53 vs. recognition dz = 0.60).
The model also reproduced the smaller mean difference in priming
between brief and long duration conditions for the experiments
with the classification task than the CID-R task (e.g.,
Fig. 1a and c). It does this because estimates of s are lower for
the classification task (Table 10), and the value of s directly affects
the magnitude of the expected priming effect, smX, and also the
expected difference in priming between duration conditions, s
(mlong  mbrief). (Note that s also affects the expected variance of
RT, rRT2 = s2rf2 + rp2.)
Considering Experiment 4 specifically, the mean estimates of s,
rp, and bwere all lower than in Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a, consis-
tent with the generally shorter RTs in this experiment using the
classification task. The difference between m in the brief and long
conditions was also smaller than in Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a.
In other words, according to the model, the effect of study duration
is smallest in this experiment, and this translates into a small pre-
dicted effect on priming (dz = 0.07) and recognition (dz = 0.86).
Also, where Predictions 2 and 3 were not upheld in the data, the
model generally predicted small differences in RTs
(Figs. 2a, c, e and 4), whereas in cases where they were upheld,
the model predicted larger differences (Fig. 2b, d and f). Again,
the reason the model predicted this is because estimates of s are
smaller for the classification task than the CID-R task. A larger
value of s produces greater differences in RTs between responses
with different expected values of f, such as hits and misses (Eq.
(2)). It is worth noting here that the value of s for the classification
task is not only small relative to estimates of s for the CID-R task,
but also small relative to the estimates of rp and b for the classifi-
cation task (i.e., the other parameters used to generate RTs). One
way of interpreting this from the model’s perspective is that the
sensitivity of RT to f in the classification task is low relative to
the CID-R task. Thus the model proposes that, with respect to mea-
suring priming, a key difference between the two experimental
tasks employed here is that they differ substantially in the extent
to which a given change in memory strength f translates into a
change in response time.
Voss and Gonsalves (2010) provided further support for an
inverse relationship between priming and recognition by showing
that recognition accuracy was poorer for items with relatively fast
priming task RTs than those with relatively slow priming task RTs
(where the fast/slow categories were defined by a median split).
That is, the recognition hit rate in the brief and long conditions
was greater for items that were identified slowly (showed less
priming), and the false alarm rate to new items was lower when
items were identified slowly (Voss & Gonsalves, 2010; Table 2).
In contrast the model predicts that an item with a fast RT is likely
to have a relatively high value of f (Eq. (2)) and therefore is also
likely to have a high value of Jr and be judged old. Thus, it predicts
that items identified quickly are also likely to be judged old,
regardless of the item type (brief, long, or new) (similar to
Prediction 2).
Table 10
Mean (and SD) of the estimated parameters of the single-system model.
Parameter Experiment
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4
l40ms – – – – 0.21 (0.20) 0.23 (0.26) –
l150ms – – – – 0.88 (0.37) 0.88 (0.49) –
l250ms 1.82 (0.35) 1.50 (0.59) 1.73 (0.48) 1.35 (0.94) 1.07 (0.49) 1.01 (0.57) 1.03 (0.57)
l350ms – – – – 1.19 (0.53) 0.96 (0.53) –
l500ms – – – – 1.24 (0.48) 1.09 (0.67) –
l1900ms – – – – 1.40 (0.57) 1.16 (0.71) –
l2000ms – – – – – – 1.28 (0.70)
l2250ms 2.24 (0.47) 1.87 (0.59) 2.19 (0.61) 1.57 (0.91) – – –
C 1.03 (0.38) 0.90 (0.39) 1.09 (0.35) 0.85 (0.58) 0.67 (0.39) 0.75 (0.44) 0.66 (0.47)
b 892.18 (262.42) 2429.76 (454.06) 967.39 (342.62) 2403.87 (431.00) 1052.41 (296.68) 3230.71 (589.03) 769.23 (213.23)
s 18.73 (26.37) 197.61 (74.27) 26.51 (25.40) 231.22 (179.81) 47.10 (50.90) 278.38 (178.32) 9.60 (18.10)
rp 243.21 (96.32) 871.87 (150.27) 309.42 (195.74) 963.34 (228.49) 394.92 (193.26) 1014.10 (135.48) 224.34 (94.57)
Note. Fixed parameters of the model are not shown in the table, but were set at rf =
p
0.5, rr =
p
0.5, lnew = 0, M(ep) = 0, M(er) = 0, across all experiments, as in previous
applications of the model (e.g., Berry et al., 2012, 2014). A dash indicates that the parameter was not used in the experiment.
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same analysis, and found the same pattern of results reported by
Voss and Gonsalves (2010) (for brief and long items, but not new
items). This is somewhat inconsistent with the single-system
model predictions, though it is not completely clear what to make
of these results, given that there were no significant differences in
RTs for brief, long, and new RTs in this particular experiment. The
data from Experiments 1–3 were pooled and also analysed in the
same way as in Voss and Gonsalves and the results are presented
in Table 11. For the classification task (Experiments 1a, 2a, and
3a pooled), there was no significant difference in the tendency to
endorse brief or long items as old between items with fast priming
task RTs versus slow priming task RTs (brief, t(92) = 0.71, p = 0.48,
95% CI [0.02, 0.04]; long, t(92) = 0.80, p = 0.43, 95% CI [0.04,
0.02]). The false alarm rate was, however, significantly greater for
items identified quickly, t(92) = 2.03, p = 0.045, 95% CI [0.0005,
0.04], as reported by Voss and Gonsalves, and as predicted by the
model. For the CID-R task (Experiments 1b, 2b, and 3b pooled),
the tendency to judge an item as old was significantly greater if
the item was identified quickly than slowly, and this was the case
for brief, t(70) = 4.65, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.05, 0.12], long, t(70) =
2.85, p = 0.006, 95% CI [0.02, 0.09], and new, t(70) = 3.86, p <
0.001, 95% CI [0.03, 0.10], items. Thus, there was no evidence for
an inverse relationship between priming and recognition in Exper-
iments 1–3. Instead, faster RTs tended to lead to a greater likeli-
hood of an old judgment in the CID-R task, in line with the
model predictions, but there was no evidence of this in the classi-
fication task.General discussion
Across seven experiments, we found no evidence that recogni-
tion memory and repetition priming are affected in opposite ways
by varying the duration with which items are initially studied.
Instead, we found that, although longer study durations improved
subsequent recognition, they either had no detectable effect on
priming (Experiments 1a, 2a, 4), or also increased priming (Exper-
iment 1b, 2b, 3a, 3b). The effect of study duration on priming in the
CID-R task was particularly robust, being detected in all experi-
ments using this task (Experiments 1b, 2b, and 3b), whereas the
effect on priming in the classification task was only found in Exper-
iment 3a. Where an effect of study duration on priming was found,
it tended to be smaller than on recognition, consistent with the
effects that we have found other variables to have on recognition
and priming, such as normal aging (Ward et al., 2013a, 2013b),
selective attention at encoding (Berry et al., 2006), and amnesia
(Berry et al., 2014).The single-system model predicts that study duration will have
qualitatively similar effects on recognition and priming (Prediction
1, see the Introduction). The model assumes that the magnitudes of
recognition and priming are positive functions of l, the mean
strength of the underlying memory signal. Since maximum likeli-
hood estimates of l tended to be greater for longer study duration
conditions (Table 10), the model predicted that both recognition
and priming would increase with study duration. When fit to the
data, the model reproduced the smaller effect on priming by
assuming that there is a greater influence of noise in the measure-
ment of the priming effect, compared to recognition. That is, the
influence of ep (in Eq. (2)) is greater than the influence of er (in
Eq. (1)) because rp is larger relative to rf than rr is relative to
rf. The magnitude of the effect of experimental variables on prim-
ing will therefore tend to be smaller than on recognition (see also
Buchner & Wippich, 2000; Meier & Perrig, 2000, for a similar
account).
We also evaluated two more subtle sets of predictions made by
the single-system model. These are important because they cap-
ture predicted associations, rather than dissociations, between
priming and recognition at the item level. For example, the model
predicts that RTs will be faster for hits than misses, and faster for
false alarms than correct rejections (as can be seen in Fig. 2). Since
hits and false alarms represent recognition (i.e., ‘‘old”) responses,
and faster RTs reflect greater priming, these predictions entail pos-
itive associations between priming and recognition in contrast to
the idea that these manifestations of memory are independent or
indeed (as claimed by Voss & Gonsalves) negatively related. Sup-
port for Predictions 2 and 3 of the single-system model (see Intro-
duction) was obtained, but only with the CID-R task. In support of
Prediction 2, identification RTs in the CID-R task to items judged
old tended to be significantly shorter than those of items judged
new, regardless of whether the item had been presented for a brief
or long duration in the study phase, or whether the item was new.
In support of Prediction 3, within brief and long item conditions,
the priming effect also tended to be greater than the priming effect
for items judged new. Confirmation of these predictions has been
important in providing evidence against a multiple-systems ver-
sion of the model in which the memory signals driving recognition
and priming are completely independent and indicate that, if there
are indeed multiple systems, then there is a high degree of associ-
ation between them (see Berry et al., 2012, 2014; Ward et al.,
2013a). The results regarding Predictions 2 and 3 were not signif-
icant in the classification task. However, trends in the direction
predicted by the single-system model were evident in many cases
(e,g., the majority of bars in Fig. 2c and e are greater than zero) and
given that the effects predicted by the model were small relative to
Table 11
Mean proportion of old judgments as a function of RT on the priming measure (in ms) in Experiments 1–3 (SE in parentheses).
Stimulus type
Brief Long New
M RT p(‘‘old”) M RT p(‘‘old”) M RT p(‘‘old”)
Classification task Fastest 714 0.73 704 0.82 741 0.21
(20) (0.01) (19) (0.01) (22) (0.01)
Slowest 1165 0.72 1138 0.84 1212 0.18
(43) (0.01) (39) (0.01) (44) (0.01)
CID-R task Fastest 1734 0.69 1668 0.74 1957 0.27
(61) (0.02) (59) (0.03) (68) (0.02)
Slowest 3225 0.61 3123 0.69 3623 0.20
(93) (0.02) (88) (0.03) (97) (0.02)
Note. The fastest and slowest categories were defined by a median split. The brief condition comprises the data combined across the 250 ms condition from Experiments 1–3.
The long condition comprises the data combined across the 2250 ms conditions in Experiments 1 and 2, and the 1900 ms (i.e., the longest) condition in Experiment 3.
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to detect these effects is due to low power. Indeed, the power of
Experiments 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4 (individually) to detect a small effect
of Cohen’s d = 0.2 was 0.23 or lower (two-tailed test).
In our study priming was found to be a monotonically increas-
ing function of study duration, but might we expect priming to be a
nonmonotonic function of study duration on the basis of other
research? For example, as mentioned previously, Zago et al.
(2005) found the magnitude of priming to rise and then fall across
study durations of 40–1900 ms, peaking at 250 ms. Miyoshi and
Ashida (2014) also found greater priming for items presented for
250 ms compared to 350 ms at study. In the Zago et al. (2005)
study, however, recognition was not measured and so it is
unknown whether recognition would show the same relationship
with study duration when the same procedures are used.
Miyoshi and Ashida (2014) did measure recognition memory, but
did not find that recognition followed a different function. Their
focus was on recognition accuracy for guesses (as this may provide
a measure of implicit recognition), which was greater for items
presented for 250 ms than 350 ms, and so showed the same pat-
tern as priming. It is important to emphasise here that the
single-system model does not necessarily predict that the magni-
tude of recognition and priming are monotonically increasing func-
tions of study duration; the model only predicts that the function
relating recognition and priming is monotonically increasing. That
is, it could be that under some specific experimental conditions
priming is a nonmonotonic function of study duration, but the
important point is that the model predicts that recognition would
also be a nonmonotonic function of study duration under the same
conditions. To provide strong evidence against the model it would
be necessary to provide evidence that the function relating the
magnitude of recognition and priming is nonmonotonic. Robust
evidence of a reversed association could potentially be sufficient
for this purpose (Dunn & Kirsner, 1988).
Finally, in this article we have not considered a large body of
neuroscientific and neuropsychological research, which is often
taken to favour the view that recognition and priming—and expli-
cit and implicit memory more broadly—have distinct neural corre-
lates and are driven by distinct brain regions (for a review see e.g.,
Reber, 2013). A full consideration of this work is beyond the scope
of this article. Our focus has been on testing the single-system
model, which makes behavioural predictions and has not been
extended to neural data. We make two points, however. First, the
present research shows that a single-system model is able to gen-
erate a pattern of findings in which an independent variable has a
much larger effect on recognition than on priming. This is precisely
the famous pattern seen in individuals with amnesia (Schacter
et al., 1993). Elsewhere (Berry et al., 2012, 2014), we have fitted
the model to data from individuals with amnesia and shown thatit is readily able to simulate the canonical patterns of priming
and recognition that are observed.
Secondly, recent research has suggested that the neural distinc-
tion between explicit and implicit memory may not be as sharp as
is widely believed, with numerous imaging studies reporting over-
lap in the brain regions associated with item recognition and rep-
etition priming (Gomes, Figueiredo, & Mayes, 2016; Thakral,
Kensinger, & Slotnick, 2015; Turk-Browne, Yi, & Chun, 2006), and
a variety of findings suggesting that the medial temporal lobes—
long thought only to be important for declarative memory—are
actually important for implicit/nondeclarative memory too (e.g.,
Addante, 2015; Berry et al., 2014; Hannula & Greene, 2012;
Henke, 2010). Recognition and priming may rely on a common
underlying memory representation that is distributed across mul-
tiple brain regions, but this representation may be accessed differ-
ently according to the demands of each task. The unidimensional
strength signal in the single-system model can be conceptualised
as characterising the influence of this memory representation on
performance in priming and recognition tasks.
To conclude, we found that studying an item for a long versus a
brief duration at encoding either 1) improves both recognition and
priming, with the effect being smaller for priming, or 2) improves
recognition, but not priming. Thus, we find no evidence that longer
durations have opposite effects on recognition and priming, as
found by Voss and Gonsalves (2010). A high-powered direct repli-
cation of Voss and Gonsalves (2010) in Experiment 4 also found
that a longer duration improves recognition, but not priming
(although it is important to note that priming effects for brief
and long items were not reliable in this experiment overall). Pre-
supposing that the greater priming for long versus brief items in
Voss and Gonsalves (2010) is not a Type I error, it is possible that
some outstanding methodological difference in our experiments,
and Experiment 4 in particular, led to the failure to replicate
(e.g., participant motivation, stimulus set). The identification of
the precise conditions that give rise to the effect therefore remains
a goal for future research. Until such conditions are identified,
however, we regard our findings as being consistent with the
single-systemmodel, which was able to reproduce the main trends
in the data and also provides a parsimonious account in that it
assumes that recognition and priming are driven by the same
memory strength signal or system, rather than distinct explicit
and implicit ones.
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